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ABSTRACT 
Simmons, Christopher Bernard. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. August/2014. 
AVOIDIT IRS: An Issue Resolution System to Resolve Cyber Attacks. Major Professor: 
Sajjan Shiva, Ph.D.  
 
 
Cyber attacks have greatly increased over the years and the attackers have 
progressively improved in devising attacks against specific targets. Cyber attacks are 
considered a malicious activity launched against networks to gain unauthorized access 
causing modification, destruction, or even deletion of data. This dissertation highlights 
the need to assist defenders with identifying and defending against cyber attacks. In this 
dissertation an attack issue resolution system is developed called AVOIDIT IRS (AIRS). 
AVOIDIT IRS is based on the attack taxonomy AVOIDIT (Attack Vector, Operational 
Impact, Defense, Information Impact, and Target). Attacks are collected by AIRS and 
classified into their respective category using AVOIDIT. 
Accordingly, an organizational cyber attack ontology was developed using 
feedback from security professionals to improve the communication and reusability 
amongst cyber security stakeholders. AIRS is developed as a semi-autonomous 
application that extracts unstructured external and internal attack data to classify attacks 
in sequential form. In doing so, we designed and implemented a frequent pattern and 
sequential classification algorithm associated with the five classifications in AVOIDIT.  
The issue resolution approach uses inference to educate the defender on the 
plausible cyber attacks. The AIRS can work in conjunction with an intrusion detection 
system (IDS) to provide a heuristic to cyber security breaches within an organization. 
AVOIDIT provides a framework for classifying appropriate attack information, which is 
fundamental in devising defense strategies against such cyber attacks. The AIRS is 
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further used as a knowledge base in a game inspired defense architecture to promote 
game model selection upon attack identification. Future work will incorporate honeypot 
attack information to improve attack identification, classification, and defense 
propagation. 
In this dissertation, 1,025 common vulnerabilities and exposures (CVEs) and over 
5,000 lines of log files instances were captured in the AIRS for analysis. Security experts 
were consulted to create rules to extract pertinent information and algorithms to correlate 
identified data for notification. The AIRS was developed using the Codeigniter [74] 
framework to provide a seamless visualization tool for data mining regarding potential 
cyber attacks relative to web applications. Testing of the AVOIDIT IRS revealed a recall 
of 88%, precision of 93%, and a 66% correlation metric.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Research 
Cyber attacks have greatly increased over the years, where the attackers have 
progressively improved in devising attacks toward a specific target. President Barack 
Obama highlighted in his cyber security initiative [1], “It’s now clear that this cyber 
threat is one of the most serious economic and national security challenges we face as a 
nation.” With cyber threats on the rise, it is necessary to correctly identify the suspected 
threat in a timely manner. Organizations, particularly small-to-medium sized, lack the 
capacity to effectively capture cyber attacks and disseminate appropriate defenses. These 
particular organizations rely on a select set of knowledgeable security personnel to 
resolve network related issues. It is imperative that the organization as a whole partake in 
fighting the pandemic of cyber attacks. An organization’s limited aptitude in capturing 
and dissecting cyber attacks in a suitable time frame can become catastrophic monetarily. 
An organization vigilant in cyber security requires people, processes, and tools to help 
maximize effectiveness of a secure organization. 
Moreover, businesses are reticent in releasing information regarding an attack to 
others, as the threat of jeopardizing their reputation exists. Therefore, knowledge bodies 
such as Computer Emergency Readiness Team (CERT) and Common Vulnerabilities and 
Exposures (CVE) are not privy to zero day attacks that are taking place within 
organizations. The collection of meaningful attack data via a local network setting is 
continuously an area of improvement for security research. For example, CERT and CVE, 
track common security vulnerabilities and incidents alerting the public of potential 
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breaches that may have an impact on organizations. The alerts presented by these 
knowledge bodies are good with seeking vulnerability information pertaining to a 
particular system. However, vulnerabilities in these repositories exist in large quantities 
and may be irrelevant to the current situation of the organization. 
In this dissertation an AVOIDIT Issue Resolution System (AIRS) is developed for 
capturing, analyzing, and disseminating content relationships. AIRS is an ontology-based 
system for organization, communication, and reusability of cyber attack knowledge. This 
research presents the concept of using an attack taxonomy to facilitate classification. 
Information extraction (IE) techniques are used to extract vulnerability information from 
external repositories. Data mining techniques are used for frequent pattern analysis to 
extract attack signatures from a knowledge repository and make meaningful relationships 
to assist an organization in disseminating defenses against cyber attacks. Further, we 
intend to implement the AIRS as a holistic component in a game inspired defense 
architecture (GIDA) with the aim of proposing game decision models associated to the 
identified attack [1D] to formulate suitable response strategies.  
1.2 Motivation and Research Questions 
The World Economic Forum has established cyber attacks as a global risk in its 2013 
Global Risk report [2]. Consequently, small organizations often lack the incentives for 
investing in a security plan that approaches the optimal level of security, thus making all 
users less secure [3]. As of 2009, NSA estimated 75% of all enterprises experienced a 
cyber attack and 80% of those cyber attacks were preventable. Since, smaller 
organizations are performing a considerable amount of business via the web, it is vital as 
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new attacks become available that we have some mechanism to learn appropriate 
defenses [4]. 
There remains a deficiency in applications to classify attack details in a local network 
setting to aid a defender in seamlessly identifying attacks and defenses. Applications such 
as intrusion prevention systems (IPS) and Firewalls require expert knowledge to 
distinguish between disparate attack vectors. Research has highlighted the need for an 
attack taxonomy that provides a holistic approach to discovery of attack vectors and 
defense propagation.  
A knowledge system harnesses tacit knowledge from subject matter experts and prior 
data to create a system where information is transferred throughout the organization. The 
basis of an AIRS provides a resource in capturing information relative to the business 
environment and engineer knowledge suitable for transfer. Knowledge systems for 
knowledge engineering have been studied extensively, but remain limited regarding 
cyber security. Asllani et al. [5] surveyed over 300 knowledge managers and found 
nominal or no evidence of security issues being considered in their jobs. A local network 
based AIRS would allow an organization to become cognizant against targeted attacks 
before they are available to the public. A knowledge based AIRS for cyber attacks aids in 
defending future attacks based on prior history of related incidents. 
To date, there is a lack of an efficient knowledge base that reports cyber incidents in a 
local setting. Furthermore, current security taxonomies are limited in efficiently 
classifying attacks, which traditionally involve the classification of vulnerabilities, 
computer and network attacks, security threats, or events. There is an increased need to 
provide an attack taxonomy that classifies attacks using a holistic approach. Winterfield 
[6] stated there is a lack of common definitions used to classify cyber attacks. Currently, 
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security taxonomies are used to generalize attacks, which inadvertently are prone to 
neglect subsequent attacks. In general, little attention has been given to successfully 
classifying ubiquitous blended attacks. A blended attack exploits one or more 
vulnerabilities to perform an attack against a target [7]. Amer and Hamilton [8] stated a 
complete secure solution considers more than one aspect. This concept is applied against 
attacks within a holistic game inspired defense architecture, where a complete diagnostic 
of attack vector information capable of launching an attack and propagating associated 
game decision models for defense.  
This research asks the following questions: 
(1) Can an attack taxonomy be designed to accurately classify attack vectors at each 
stage of an attack, including blended attacks? 
(2) Can an ontology based issue resolution system be developed to publicize attack 
and defense strategies within an organization to improve communication and 
defense reusability? 
(3) How will related attack information be correlated and attack information 
validated? 
(4) Can the issue resolution system properly disseminate game models relative to the 
identified attack? 
These questions allow researchers and practitioners to craft pragmatic ways with 
properly defending a network against cyber attacks and develop a holistic approach to an 
organization’s cyber security awareness. 
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1.3 Goal and Contribution 
This research reveals the need for an enhanced issue resolution system for cyber 
attacks. This dissertation builds upon data mining techniques and the use of prior security 
taxonomies and ontologies. Attack information is extracted to correlate data from 
vulnerability repositories and web logs. Detailed transactions and various logs can be 
used to reconstruct a sequence of events that preceded a problem [9]. This enables a 
centralized location of all incidents to be correlated based on the sequence of events. Han 
et al. [10] highlighted the importance of frequent patterns for data indexing, classification, 
clustering, etc. Accurate cyber attack classification is pertinent for damage assessment 
and recovery.  
A data warehouse is built to efficiently collect and segment information within an 
issue resolution system. This strategy allows data to flow more accurately within an 
organization and is easier for computer agents to search and find the most relevant 
defense mechanisms from the knowledge repository. Targeted information includes 
vulnerabilities, attacks, and defenses for cyber security. CERT and CVE vulnerability 
reports are used. One key aspect of this research demonstrates an attack taxonomy can be 
utilized within a knowledge repository efficiently classifying attack vectors and its 
relevant information.  
In conjunction with the classification aspect, information extraction and data mining 
techniques are applied to capture the complete attack path and propagate appropriate 
defense mechanisms for an organization to become resilient in cyber security. Landwehr 
et al. [11] state a taxonomy is most useful when it classifies threats in scope that 
correspond to potential defenses. The future of durable applications depends on 
organizations locating attack vectors in a timely manner and thwarting their damage 
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causing capabilities. Accomplishing this requires a well-organized knowledge base 
containing validated information and pattern identification to predict attack trends.  
AVOIDIT IRS will present a common platform for the management of cyber security 
incidents. Employing AVOIDIT as the repository schema, an ontology based system is 
developed called AVOIDIT IRS. AVOIDIT IRS captures attack vector information of an 
attack from web log files, vulnerability repositories, and intrusion detection system log 
files to disseminate defense strategies to an organization. The issue resolution system will 
use a frequent pattern algorithm for event correlation from the various sources to 
consolidate all sources into a centralized location based on the sequence of events. 
This research makes several contributions to the security field. It builds upon the use 
of vulnerability taxonomies in the security field (e.g. Howard [12], Lough [13], Hansman 
and Hunt [7]) and provides an issue resolution approach to develop a security based 
system for small to medium sized organizations. This project is based on attacks against 
applications that are setup on a local network, which will be captured via web logs and 
vulnerability repositories. Event correlation is performed using a frequent pattern 
algorithm from the various sources for a centralized sequence of events. It involves an 
intense strategy to develop an efficient ontology ensuring organizational communication 
within the AIRS. AIRS is developed using an open source content management system, 
which uses the PHP5 Codeigniter framework. MySQL 6.0 is used as the open source data 
repository. The AIRS will be used in presenting a common gateway for an organization 
to resolve cyber attacks in an efficient manner. 
This research is among the first to demonstrate an ontology based system used to 
extract defense strategies through terms and relations from a large corpus.  An attack 
taxonomy can be used as a foundation to classify a vast array of attacks. Data stored 
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within the repository is easily queried to retrieve frequent and/or sequential data items. 
Applying the attack taxonomy in an issue resolution setting along with a correlation 
algorithm enables the next generation of the knowledge base systems to depend more on 
ontologies for spreading knowledge regarding an attack throughout the organization. We 
further extend this research by incorporating the knowledge base within the GIDA 
framework to store and retrieve game decision models relevant to an identified attack. 
1.4 Scope 
The scope of this research is to build a prototype of an issue resolution system for 
cyber attacks discovery and defense solutions. In this research two levels of 
communication will be reviewed using manual and automated scenarios to determine the 
impact of AIRS’s ability to autonomously classify, alert, and provide defense strategies to 
cyber attacks. 
The AIRS is a ticketing system that will identify and track cyber incidents in a tree 
structure displaying the complete path to an attack. Using a metric module the AIRS will 
support monitoring, measuring, and reporting security incidents of monitored systems. 
The AIRS will provide a user management module for roles based access.  
The issue resolution system will capture and analyze inputs from the following 
devices and repositories: system logs, web application logs, common vulnerabilities and 
exposures repository, and manual ticket input from the AIRS. The AIRS will alert 
administrators of potential breaches within monitored applications. This research will 
focus on open source web application vulnerabilities that make up the majority of attacks. 
The issue resolution system will not provide input from firewall components. The 
AIRS will not execute or modify any IDS related policy files. AIRS will not directly 
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locate or correct any code related to web application vulnerabilities. The AIRS is limited 
in the GIDA framework to retrieving predefined game models stored within the 
repository that have been previously associated with an identified attack. 
This dissertation is organized as follows: In Chapter 2 a literature review is provided 
on incident taxonomies, ontology development, pattern algorithms, and knowledge base 
systems. In Chapter 3 the research methodology of AVOIDIT IRS is highlighted. Chapter 
4 presents the implementation details of the AVOIDIT IRS, followed by the experiment 
and results in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 concludes this research and discusses limitations to 
AVOIDIT IRS, as well as insight for future work.  
2. LITERATURE SURVEY 
In this section, an overview of attack and vulnerability taxonomies is provided. A 
taxonomy defines what data is to be recorded and how like and unlike samplings are to be 
distinguished [11]. An ontology is a common way to organize knowledge and involves 
the description of objects and relationships [16]. Emphasis is placed on ontology 
development methodologies and knowledge base systems that provide support for an 
ontology based system for cyber attack issue resolution. Frequent and sequential pattern 
algorithms are also highlighted for correlating events.  
2.1 Taxonomies 
This section focuses network and computer security taxonomies, as well as 
vulnerability taxonomies. Other taxonomies are presented related to cloud computing, 
network security tools, and intrusion detection systems. 
Kjaerland’s Taxonomy 
Kjaerland [14] proposed a taxonomy of cyber-intrusions from Computer Emergency 
Response Team (CERT) related to computer crime profiling, highlighting cyber-criminals 
and victims. In this research, attacks were analyzed using facet theory and 
multidimensional scaling (MDS) with Method of Operation, Target, Source, and Impact. 
The method of operation is tactics used by the attacker to carry out the attack, such as 
Misuse of Resources, User Compromise, Root Compromise, Social Engineering, Web 
Compromise, Virus, Trojan, Worm, Recon, and Denial of Service. Target is the victim of 
the attack, relative to commercial or government. Source is the source of the incident 
capturing information regarding the attacker. Elements contained within source facet are 
 10 
commercial, government, education, international, user, or unknown. Finally, the impact 
facet is the effect of the attack, which contains the variables disrupt, destruct, distort, 
disclose, or unknown.  
The use of MDS is typically used in traditional crimes, wherein Kjaerland uses it to 
analyze 23 variables associated to the four facets of cyber intrusion against commercial 
versus government entities. Kjaerland discusses the lack of reporting of cyber incidents, 
along with its lack of understanding. Kjaerland’s taxonomy focuses on the motive of the 
attacker in an attempt to quantify why the attack takes place, and where the attack 
originated.  Her taxonomy contains some limitations as she provides a high level view to 
the methods of operation without providing more details to the methods that can be used 
in identifying attack inception. Kjaerland’s taxonomy provides a good starting point for 
improved cyber attack taxonomy classifications. 
Hansman and Hunt’s Taxonomy 
Hansman and Hunt [7] proposed a taxonomy with four unique dimensions that provide 
a holistic classification covering network and computer attacks.  Their taxonomy provides 
assistance in improving computer and network security as well as consistency in language 
with attack description. The first dimension  (attack vector) is used to classify the attack in 
the following categories: virus, worm, Trojan, buffer overflow, network attack, physical 
attack, password attack, and information gathering attacks. The second dimension 
classifies the target of the attack, which involve either hardware or software. Each 
software and hardware category provides further classification.  The third dimension 
consists of the vulnerability classification number, or criteria from Howard’s taxonomy 
[12], relative to the vulnerability in implementation, vulnerability in design, or 
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vulnerability in configuration. The fourth and final dimension highlights the payload or 
effects involved, whether it is a subsequent first dimension, corruption of information, 
disclosure of information, theft of service, or subversion. Within each dimension various 
sublevels of information are provided to supply attack details.  
Hansman and Hunt [7] provided a unique loopback feature in their fourth dimension to 
the first dimension of their taxonomy to aid in attack classification. They mentioned the 
need of future work to improve classifying blended attacks, which is a limitation within 
their taxonomy.  Another limitation is the lack of vulnerability information, which 
prohibits capturing information to aid in protecting a system from attacks. Hansman and 
Hunt’s provide an intuitive perspective to classifying computer and network related 
attacks for improvement. 
Mirkovic and Reihner’s Taxonomy 
Mirkovic and Reihner [15] offer a comprehensive taxonomy of Distributed Denial of 
Services (DDoS) attack and defense mechanisms in aim to classify attacks and defense 
strategies.  This research highlights features of attack strategies, where the strategies are 
imperative in devising countermeasures. The goal is to provide distinct characteristics of a 
DDoS attack along with their differences to aid in analyzing variations of a DDoS attack 
for prevention.  
In their first taxonomy, Mirkovic and Reihner provide a taxonomy of DDoS attacks 
categorized by Degree of Automation, Exploited Weakness, Source Address Validity, 
Attack Rate Dynamics, Possibility of Characterization, Persistent Agent Set, Victim Type, 
and Impact on Victim.  The degree of automation is semi-automated, automated, or 
manual relative to the recruit, exploit, infect, and use phases. The exploited weakness 
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involves the type of exploit a vulnerability is used to deny the service of a victim to its 
client, whether semantic or brute force. The source address validity captures whether the 
source IP address has been spoofed or if it is a valid source IP address. The attack rate 
dynamics involve the rate participating agents are sending packet streams to the victim, 
which are classified by constant rate or variable rate attacks. The possibility of 
characterizations looks at the content and header fields in an attempt to differentiate the 
attack, where it is classified as characterizable or non-characterizable.  The persistent 
agent set is used to determine if the agent set is persistent or varied, which can determine 
traceability of the attack. Host, network, application, resource, or infrastructure attacks 
distinguish the victim type. Lastly, impact on victim involves whether the attack was 
disruptive or degrading. These categories are used to examine the exploitation, the victim 
impact, and characteristics with exploiting a DDoS attack.  
In addition to classifying DDoS attacks, Mirkovic and Reihner developed a second 
taxonomy of DDoS defenses consisting of Activity Level, Cooperation Degree, and 
Deployment Location. The activity level involves whether the defense is preventative or 
reactive. The cooperation degree is whether defense was conducted solely or in 
cooperation with other entities, thus differentiated using autonomous, cooperative, and 
interdependent solutions. Lastly, the deployment location comprises whether the defense 
was deployed at the victim, intermediate, or source network location. Both the DDoS 
attack and defense taxonomies are used in combination for classifying DDoS attacks and 
potential defenses to provide communication of threats to foster cooperation between 
researchers for discussing solutions. 
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Lough’s Taxonomy 
Lough [13] proposed an attack-centric taxonomy called VERDICT (Validation 
Exposure Randomness Deallocation Improper Conditions Taxonomy). Lough focuses on 
four major causes of security errors: Improper Validation, Improper Exposure, Improper 
Randomness, and Improper Deallocation. He labels these four characteristics with a prefix 
of “Improper” with attacks being thought of as improper conditions. Validation refers to 
improperly validating or unconstrained data, which also includes physical security. 
Exposure involves the improper exposure of information that could be used directly or 
indirectly for the exploitation of a vulnerability. Randomness deals with the fundamentals 
of cryptography and the improper usage of randomness. Deallocation is the improper 
destruction of information, or residuals of data, which also includes dumpster diving. 
Lough uses one or more of these characteristics to describe vulnerability within a system.  
Lough describes his taxonomy as comprehensive, as it appears to fit a majority of 
computer attacks from a high level. Hansman and Hunt [7] described Lough’s taxonomy 
as lacking pertinent information that would be beneficial for knowledge bodies, such as 
CERT, to classify day-to-day attacks and issuing advisories. Lough’s taxonomy lacks the 
classification of significant attack types, such as worms, Trojans, viruses, etc., that would 
give a defender useful information. 
Howard’s Taxonomy 
Howard and Longstaff [12] provided an incident taxonomy that classifies attacks by 
events.  An event is an attack directed at a specific target intended to result in a changed 
state.  The event involves the action and the target.  They highlight steps that encompass 
an attack and how an attack develops.  The attack consists of five logical steps an attacker 
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performs to achieve an unauthorized result. Those steps are: tools, vulnerability, action, 
target, and unauthorized result. The tool refers to the mechanism used to perform the 
attack. The vulnerability is the type of exploit used to perform attack.  The action refers to 
the method used by the attacker to perform the attack (i.e. Probe, Scan, Authenticate, etc.).  
The target is the intention the attack is attempting to compromise; and the unauthorized 
result is the change state caused due to the attack.   
Howard and Longstaff’s taxonomy presents a process to unearthing attack details 
based on the use of security incident theory with CERT classification for refinement. 
Although Howard and Longstaff presented a useful taxonomy that provides an informative 
baseline for cyber intrusions, their taxonomy lacks details needed for thorough insight into 
the attack. 
Jiang’s Taxonomy 
Jiang et al. [92] proposed a defense-oriented multidimensional attack taxonomy 
(DMAT). The taxonomy utilize nine classifiers to capture the characteristic of the attack. 
These classifiers are attack target, attack impact, attack purpose, attack cost, attack 
exploiting, attack source, attack automation, attack loss and defense.  
In this research, Jiang et al. [92] compares their taxonomy to the Hansman’s [7] and 
Howard’s [12] taxonomies using the Code Red [97] and Wu-ftpd [98] attacks, and claims 
an advantage due to the ability to classify the cause of the worm infection. Although, the 
taxonomy at face value appears to be an improvement to Hansman’s [7] and Howard’s 
[12] taxonomies, Jiang et al. [92] taxonomy is limited in regard to its use. An example is 
provided with the code red and wu-ftpd attacks, but does not capture the essence in which 
to classify the events. Moreover, the taxonomy has the capability of decreasing its 
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classifiers. For example, attack loss has security attribute loss and damage level, wherein 
if the damage level is high, it would appear to impact the security attribute loss of 
confidentiality, integrity or usability. In the example provided by Jiang et al. [92], the code 
red and wu-ftpd did not possess a security loss attribute when in fact the usability was 
definitely impacted with code red. Jiang et al. [92], research to the proposed defense-
oriented multidimensional attack taxonomy is inspiring in what it intends to capture, but 
limited in the key mutual exclusive requirement of a taxonomy. 
Applegate and Stavrou’s Taxonomy 
Applegate and Stavrou [93] presented a novel taxonomy, an extension from taxonomy 
developed in this research that classifies cyber conflicts using a plex data structure. The 
proposed taxonomy attempts expand the traditional cyber warfare taxonomy into a cyber 
conflict taxonomy describing the events between nations (entities), as well as non-nation 
(entities). Applegate and Stavrou [93] taxonomy is classified beginning with categories 
and subjects. The categories are classified using action and actor, whereas the subjects are 
classified using entity and event. The action classifier sub-classifies action conflicts as 
defense and intrusion. The defense is a high-level conflict scenario involving various 
resources. The intrusion involves vector, operation impact, systems impact, and 
informational impact, derived mainly from this research.  
Applegate and Stavrou [93] taxonomy has presented an alternative way to classify 
cyber warfare under the auspice of conflict, which appear the same. In analyzing cyber 
conflict, this research compares Howard’s [12] and AVOIDIT [1B] taxonomies using the 
Shady RAT intrusion, with improved results. Although, this work has presented an alleged 
taxonomy, it appears this work is inline using an ontology, being that the disparate 
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concepts are being presented as one. The comparison cannot truly match with adding non-
cyber attack related classifiers. Applegate and Stavrou [93] enhancement to the AVOIDIT 
[1B] taxonomy when presented in a cyber conflict manner provides a good fit for 
operational plans for strategy assessment. 
Uma and Padmavathi’s Taxonomy 
Uma and Padmavathi [94] proposed a high-level cyber attack taxonomy to classify 
various attacks and the mode of action for appropriate defense. The taxonomy has five 
main classifiers, which are attack purpose, legal classification, severity of involvement, 
scope and network type. Attack purpose involves reconnaissance attack, access attack, and 
denial of service attack. Legal classification contains cyber crime, cyber espionage, cyber 
terrorism, and cyber war. Severity of involvement corresponds to either passive or active 
attacks. Scope pertains to malicious large scale or non-malicious small scale. Lastly, 
network type classifies attacks either in mobile ad-hoc network (MANET) or wireless 
sensor network (WSN).   
Uma and Padmavathi’s [94] taxonomy provides a start to classify various cyber crime 
attacks. This taxonomy lacks the ability to succinctly classify the types of attacks 
mentioned in their research. It is unclear how their taxonomy is used in general with 
respect to a specific attack. For example, a reconnaissance attack is listed as packet sniffer, 
port scanning, ping sweeps or distributed network services queries. These do not 
necessarily mean an attack has been successful, but normally precede a cyber attack. 
Other Taxonomies 
Li et al. [89] presented a taxonomy of general cyber attacks on smart grid 
communication. These attacks involve device attacks aiming to compromise a grid. Data 
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attacks are where attempts are made to insert, alter, or delete data in network traffic to 
deceive smart grid decision-making. Privacy attacks aim to capture privacy related data, 
while analyzing electricity usage data. Network availability attacks aim to overwhelm or 
fully consume resources of smart grid resulting in a delay or disruption of communication. 
Hashemi and Ardakani [90] proposed a taxonomy of security aspects of cloud 
computing systems. Cloud computing system threats presented are infrastructure, 
application, platform, and administration. Infrastructure related threats are classified using 
physical security, virtualization, host, and network. Application threats involve data 
security and application security. Platform involves platform security; lastly 
administration encompasses provider and government. Hashemi and Ardakani have 
presented a good starting point to begin the improvement of predecessor taxonomies 
associated with cloud computing attack incidents. 
Zhu and Sastry [91] proposed a taxonomy of cyber attacks on supervisory control and 
data acquisition (SCADA) systems. The aim is to capture the understanding of SCADA 
systems by presenting the relation to IT systems. Zhu and Sastry classify attacks on 
SCADA systems using the vulnerability, the type of attack on hardware, the type of attack 
on software, and the type of attack on the communication stack. The various attack 
classifications compose the cyber-physical related attacks. Zhu and Sastry provide more 
descriptive categories in the software and communication related attacks, whereas the 
vulnerability and hardware related classifiers are general in nature. This research gives rise 
to incorporating physical attack initiatives relative to cyber security. 
Koch et al. [95] presented current attack trends in computer networks and proposed an 
IDS taxonomy to improve upon the shortcomings of existing IDS related taxonomies.  
Some of the current attack trends involve application layer attacks, zero-day exploits, 
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social engineering attacks, targeted attacks, dissemination routes, data leakage and insider 
attacks, encryption attacks, IPv6 and cloud computing related attacks. The proposed IDS 
taxonomy is an extension of an existing IDS taxonomy [95], involving detection method, 
behavior of detection, audit source location, detection paradigm, and usage frequency. 
Koch et al. [95] provides an additional classifier completeness as well as its sub-level data 
dependency and incident. Although, Koch et al. [95] proposed taxonomy is an 
enhancement from previous work, it is stated there remains the inability to capture social 
engineering, targeted or insider attacks, but these attacks are very prevalent and should be 
considered when assessing an IDS. 
Hoque et al. [96] proposed a taxonomy of network security tools that can be utilized 
by both attacker and defender to strengthen the research of network security. An 
exhaustive survey of attacker and defender tools were evaluated to provide the reviewer 
with benefits and shortcomings of the evaluated tools and classified in their respective 
categories. The taxonomy classifies network security tools according to attacker tools and 
defender tools. Attacker tools involve information gathering and attack launching. Attack 
launching classifies the tools with respect to Trojans, DoS/DDoS, packet forging attack, 
application layer attack, fingerprinting attack, user attack and others. Information 
gathering is shared between the attacker and defender, which encompass sniffing and 
network mapping/scanning. Classifying tools beneficial to the defender are considerably 
limited; comprise information gathering and network monitoring. Network monitoring 
classifiers only include visualization and analysis. Hoque et al. [96] provides great insight 
for research looking to incorporate tools into future cyber attack taxonomies, as the 
attacker’s method of operation can be captured by sophisticated defense infrastructures. 
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2.2 Ontology 
In this section, an overview of ontology methodologies and security ontologies is 
provided. An ontology enables a mutual way to organize knowledge and involves the 
description of objects and their relationships [16]. Furthermore, ontologies provide a 
mechanism for shared vocabularies, which allow an improvement of information retrieval, 
and assist data integration [17]. Generally speaking, an ontology captures explicit 
knowledge used for concepts and relationship building to infer implicit knowledge. Wang 
and Guo [18] stated a heavy-weight ontology may be considered a formal logic system, 
which includes rules, concepts, concept taxonomies, relationships, properties, axioms and 
constraints. 
Ontology Development Methodologies 
There are several methodologies that highlight ontology development within various 
disciplines. Methontology is an ontology building methodology that focuses on the reuse 
or reengineering ontologies [19].The CO4 project involves a methodology that builds 
upon incremental knowledge being integrated into a knowledge base formally and 
informally [17]. The KACTUS project involves a methodology that builds upon itself as 
knowledge grows during each application being implemented [20]. The On-To-
Knowledge methodology involves gathering project objectives through four steps: 
kickoff, refinement, evaluation, and ontology maintenance that are used within a 
knowledge management tool [20]. Although, this research is not focused on the 
knowledge gained by the development of applications and projects, a focal point is placed 
on the knowledge gained from each discovered use of an attack vector and associated 
information.  
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Cheah [17] described the need of multi-site project management (MSPM), where a 
need for an ontology that best suites this genre of knowledge as software development is 
becoming a multi-site initiative. OWL was used to conceptualize the knowledge 
specifications into logical data models. Jarrar et al. [21] proposed using conceptual data 
modeling techniques for building ontologies. This provided an ontology-engineering 
framework that enables reusing conceptual models for modeling and representing 
ontologies. Guarino [22] explored the strong connection between knowledge engineering, 
conceptual modeling, and formal ontologies to enhance the emerging field of ontology 
engineering. This research involving the development of ontologies assisted with the 
baseline for the development of the AVOIDIT IRS Ontology. 
D’ Amico et al. Security Ontology 
 D’Amico et al. [23] presented a mission critical ontology used to provide asset 
relationship with users in the event of a cyber attack. This work was composed at a 
workshop derived from the Camus project, in which security experts within the 
commercial sector and military were surveyed using situational cyber analysis to develop 
the mission critical ontology. This work was developed in aspiration to further research in 
regards to security knowledge elicitation or to assist organizations with scenario analysis. 
Simmonds et al. Network Security Attack Ontology 
Simmonds et al. [24] proposed an ontology to network security classification based 
on prior taxonomies addressing the commonality for an extensible approach to 
classifying attacks. The classes within the ontology are Access, Actor, Attack, Impact, 
Information, Intangible, Motive, Outcome, Systems Administrator, and Threat.  The 
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associated properties are assesses, causes loss of, gains, has, loses, makes, reports, and 
uses. The properties seem to be verbs, which appear to allow association of the classes. 
2.3 Mining Algorithms 
In this section, an overview of the mining algorithms used in this research is provided 
to capture the frequency and sequential aspects of attack events. The offered algorithms 
give insight to data mining techniques for a foundation of extracting sequential events 
based on the frequency of occurrences within a repository.  
Frequent Pattern Algorithms 
Han et al. FP-Tree 
Han et al. [25] proposed a frequent-pattern tree approach to mining large amounts of 
frequent patterns in a transactional database. Han et al. provides an extension to the 
Apriori algorithm through the use of partitions, divide-and-conquer growth patterns. This 
approach utilizes solutions to smaller tasks. The approach scans the database twice: one 
to get frequencies and another to construct the frequency tree. Efficiency is achieved 
using three techniques: a large database is compressed into a smaller data structure, a fp-
tree-based mining using pattern-fragment growth is used to avoid costly generation, and a 
partitions-based divide and conquer method increases efficiency.  
Han et al. [25] FP-Tree algorithm being a divide and conquer sheds light on the 
extending the Apriori algorithm, which is a bottom-up algorithm, to garner a mechanism 
of decreasing the sample space from a search. This algorithm was not used per se but 
provided direction in algorithm development. 
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CanTree 
Leung et al. [26] proposed a canonical-order tree algorithm that captures the content 
of the transaction database and orders tree nodes, called CanTree. This work provided an 
extension to the FP-tree algorithm for incremental mining. Leung et al. [26] uses CanTree 
to efficiently arrange tree nodes according to canonical order, which are unaffected by 
frequency item changes. This provides easy maintenance when transactions are modified 
within a database. 
Leung et al. [26] CanTree canonical-order algorithm assisted with rule setting. The 
CanTree algorithm was used as a guide for algorithm development in this research, which 
allows an administrator the ability to continuously develop, enhance and implement rules 
to capture attack events. Attack events detected in our web logs, which violate system 
rules, can be correlated with external information for notification.  
TreeMiner 
Zaki [27] presented a TreeMiner algorithm that discovers all frequent subtrees in a 
forest. This novel algorithm performed a depth first search for frequent subtrees using a 
tree representation called scope list. The use of scope list improved the ability for fast 
support counting of candidate trees.  
Zaki [27] TreeMiner algorithm supports this research in searching the repository for 
existing trees that associated to attack events. The TreeMiner was not implemented in this 
research, but guided the initiative of a depth first search for previous trees that contained 
suspecting vulnerabilities along with their probable sequence for administrator 
notification.  
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Stein et al. 
Stein et al. [28] proposed a genetic algorithm used to select an optimal subset of 
features for network intrusion detection systems, both misuse and anomaly based systems. 
Decision tree classifier is a well-known machine learning technique, which is simply a 
divide-and-conquer procedure. Genetic algorithms are frequent solutions that have been 
applied to search and optimization problems. A hybrid approach of the two efficiently 
classifies signatures from an IDS. The classification was improved, but the running time 
saw an increase. 
Stein et al. [27] algorithm, which supports misuse and anomaly based systems, 
provide a great analysis of capturing IDS related events. Although, IDSs are a great 
assistance to capturing attack related events, this research did not implement any aspect 
of Stein, et al.’s algorithm.  
Ning et al.  
Ning et al. [29] proposed three utilities to facilitate correlating a large dataset of IDS 
related alerts. These utilities are adjustable graph reduction, focused analysis, and graph 
decomposition. This resulted in the correlation of using consequences of earlier events 
with prerequisites later events. Ning et al. [29] presents an interesting approach to 
navigate through the enormous amounts of data captured from an IDS. The following 
work [30] is an extension, which focused on correlation to construct attack scenarios 
using hyper-alert type representing prerequisite and consequences of each alert type of an 
attack. 
Ning et al. [29] algorithm using graph reduction and decomposition highlights the 
ability to correlate IDS related events. Even though their algorithm was not implemented 
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in this research, it guides with composing attack scenarios for rule generation. Once a 
rule is violated and detected, the correlation mechanism is procured for notification to the 
administrator. 
Sequential Pattern Algorithms 
SPADE 
Zaki et al. [31] offered a new algorithm for sequential pattern discovery using 
equivalent classes approach to mining frequent sequences called SPADE. SPADE uses 
ID lists for temporal joins, and a lattice-theoretic approach to decompose the original 
search space. This work incorporates both depth first and breadth first search approaches 
to enumerate the frequent sequences within each sub-lattice. Zaki et al. shows SPADE to 
scale linearly in database size.  
The SPADE algorithm aids this research in the sequential pattern discovery aspect. 
The equivalent classes approach was used in this research relative to the equivalence of 
attack vector information. Whereas, SPADE used both breath first and depth first 
searches, this research focused only on the depth first search aspect to capture the 
sequence of events.  
TSP 
Tzvetkov et al. [32] proposed a sequential pattern algorithm called TSP that mines the 
top-k closed sequential patterns. This is used to prune the projected database and perform 
dynamic support raising. Along with the TSP algorithm, Tzvetkov et al. introduced a 
closed pattern verification algorithm, which guarantees the candidate result set contains 
the desired number of closed sequential patterns during the mining process. 
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The TSP algorithm is based on the depth first search algorithm of Prefix-Span. We 
utilize aspects of the TSP algorithm in a manner of structuring our algorithm to prune the 
database based on specific attack vector types and their frequencies, which produces a 
probable sequential tree. Our algorithm differs from producing a set of closed sequential 
patterns, but one sequential pattern that best fit the probability of an attack instance. 
Prefix-Span 
Pei et al. [33] proposed a prefix-projected sequential pattern mining (Prefix-Span) that 
explores prefix-projection in sequential patterns. Prefix-Span was developed to reduce the 
time of subsequence generation while mining the complete set of patterns. The goal of 
PrefixSpan is to examine the prefix subsequences that allow a representation of the postfix 
subsequences in the database. PrefixSpan may impose a cost from recursively constructing 
projected databases for each sequential pattern. Pei et al. described the use of bi-level 
projection and pseudo projection to reduce the cost of producing projected databases. The 
pseudo project dramatically reduces cost due to its ability of housing the projected 
databases in main memory. 
PrefixSpan presents the groundwork for developing a sequential pattern algorithm. An 
updated sequential algorithm was analyzed for components of algorithm development 
within this research. 
2.4 Machine Learning and Information Extraction 
Gutta [34] proposed a new cyber attack detection system that encompasses the 
multiple sensor notification in a distributed fashion. This work takes aim at generalizing 
attack pattern classification to learn and adapt to innovative intrusions to create an 
autonomous learning system. Gutta uses the support vector machine (SVM) as the binary 
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classifier to classify cyber attack information, with a lack of efficiency mentioned relative 
to the performance of using preset parameters in the SVM with large datasets. Gutta 
proposes a more efficient performing SVM by retaining only the pertinent samples that 
have potential of becoming a part of the support vectors through clustering using a 
Bayesian approach, which does not require preset parameters, followed by a logistic 
regression for sample elimination.  
Tran [35] proposed one-class SVMs applied to the 1999 DARPA dataset. TCPSTAT 
was used to extract network information over an allotted timeframe as input to the one-
class SVM classifier. Although only five of TCPSTAT parameters were used, Tran 
achieved a seventy-one percent (71%) detection rate, and only twenty (20) false alarms 
per day. 
Mill [36] extended the SVM architecture to include two new implementations. The 
training datasets were partitioned and used to train SVMs. In the TreeSVM 
implementation, the results of the training on the first subset are used to train the next 
subset. A single set of SVMs result from this partitioning. In the ArraySVM 
implementation, the SVMs that were trained on each partition were not combined, but 
instead placed in an array and applied to all the input data. The SVM that produced the 
greatest response to the input data-point was used to classify it.   
Fink et al. [37] proposed a toolkit for the detection of complex cyber threats using 
machine learning and crowdsourcing. This proposed system enables a user feedback 
mechanism, where the feedback is analyzed with machine learning capabilities, providing 
a cooperation loop with user feedback and automated threat detection. Fink et al. [37] 
presents novel work to create a community to fight cyber threats in the form of website 
scams and cross-site request forgery. In defending against website scams, Fink et al. [37] 
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developed a host analyzer that incorporated analysis of website statistics in an attempt to 
locate sites that potentially pose as a security threat. This work is formulated relative to 
taking the use of public knowledge to disperse cyber attack information regarding 
malicious sites.  
2.5 Threat Modeling 
Topological Vulnerability Analysis (TVA) 
Jajodia and Noel [38] proposed a novel way of implementing evolved attack graphs 
for advanced cyber attack modeling, analysis, and visualization using a topological 
vulnerability analysis (TVA) project. The TVA is able to model, network and software 
configurations, along with their vulnerabilities, as well as the connection to the 
vulnerable services. This enables the capability of matching preexisting modeled exploits 
to simulate blended attacks. Jajodia and Noel [38] TVA attack graphs can identify critical 
vulnerabilities and provide solutions to defend network assets. Further, vulnerability 
metrics from CVSS were filtered through TVA to provide a metric to compare the risk 
mitigation options toward maximizing security and minimizing costs.  
Attack Graph Evaluation 
Xie et al. [39] proposed a two-layer attack graph to thwart inside malicious attackers 
from attacking the network. The upper layer is the host access graph and the lower layer 
is  the host-pair attack graph. Xie et al. [39] proposed this method to be rational using the 
host-central model wherein the attacker has used stepping stones to obtain user or root 
level access to the network, which would decrease the computation time in computing an 
attack graph. 
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Xie et al. [39] utilize host-pair attack, and host access graphs are generated using the 
probability of obtaining user and root privileges through the structure of the graphs in 
every host-pair attack graph, then redrawn to obtain a host access graph. The host access 
graph and the color matrixes in a gray scale format are used as the method to generate a 
visual representation. The inside hosts are analyzed to determine if an attack has 
transpired via user and root level privileges, where the adjacency matrix is used to 
evaluate network security. 
NetSPA 
Inglos et al. [40] proposed the multiple-requisite graph tool NetSPA, which imports 
data from multiple sources to autonomously compute reachability for a given host to 
connect to open ports. NetSPA is able to generate attack graph to analyze 250 actual 
hosts and 50,000 simulated hosts. NetSPA uses a matrix to determine the reachability of a 
network using typical information of hosts, IP addresses, open port number, and protocol. 
Once the reachability is determined using reverse reachability (i.e., for a given interface, 
exit nodes and walk the chain backwards), the attack graph was constructed, followed by 
the computed suggested remediation procedures. 
Parameters from the host interface (ip address, port number, and protocol) were used 
to construct attack graphs. NetSPA  constructs attack graphs on a breadth-first technique 
and uses a method to model reachability using tuples of the form [source IP ->  target  IP: 
portnum/protocol]. The maximum number of nodes in an MP graph is linearly related to 
the source data. The graphs are generated by utilizing a collapsed reachability matrix as 
input. Using the collapsed reachability matrix and providing reachability groups, 
drastically reduces the cost of computing the reachability matrix. NetSPA uses graphviz 
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to visualize the graphs. Inglos et al. [40] recognized the need to improve the graph 
visualization aspect of this work. The properties analyzed are firewall settings of inbound 
and outbound traffic. Implementation of the properties was done by grouping host and 
firewalls and using firewall rulesets. NetSPA provides recommendations through the 
computation of individual prerequisite nodes in a graph to determine the vulnerabilities of 
concern to prevent the attack from satisfying the prerequisite, along with states the attack 
cannot reach. The method used to evaluate this approach involves testing 250 actual hosts 
and 50,000 simulated hosts. The results show graph generation in a suitable time frame 
and linearly scales relative to the input. 
NetSPA Extended 
Inglos et al. [41] proposed a novel way of modeling network attacks, as well as 
simple countermeasures, of the adversary. This paper is a continuation of previous work 
of the NetSPA attack graph, which has been used to analyze 3,000 actual hosts and 
50,000 simulated hosts. NetSPA uses a matrix to determine the reachability of a network 
using typical information of hosts, IP addresses , open port number, and protocol. Once 
the reachability is determined using reverse reachability (i.e. for a given interface exit 
nodes and walk the chain backwards), the attack graph is constructed, followed by the 
computed suggested remediation procedures. Inglos et al. [41] work mainly utilizes 
rulesets of firewalls, i.e., those of personal and the initial border network based firewall. 
In this work, no specific attack was used in experimentation, but a scan of the network to 
uncover client side vulnerabilities was conducted. The researchers utilized the I – K 
matrix to discover the reachability of a network prone to an attack. This improved work 
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was able to scan more than 40,000 simulated hosts, where analyses of these hosts were 
done in less than two minutes. 
NAVIGATOR 
Chu et al. [42] proposed the visualization tool called NAVIGATOR, which is an 
improved tool from the previous work of NetSPA and GARNET, which is designed to 
depict the current state of the system for future security planning. NAVIGATOR builds 
upon GARNET, which utilizes the strip tree algorithm to process the grouping of hosts. 
NAVIGATOR is built using Java with a C++ engine for calculating attack graphs and 
reachability. The improvement in NAVIGATOR from its predecessor has given it the 
ability to represent client site and trust relationship exploits, as well as view the 
infrastructure devices and network topology with zooming features for an in-depth 
analysis. NAVIGATOR provides recommendation sets, as well as proposed scenarios to 
determine the impact the recommendation may have on the system. 
Danforth 
Danforth [43] proposed an efficient rule-based approach for generating attack graphs 
through aggregating individual attacks into abstract classes, as well as clustering identical 
machines to reduce visual complexity. This work takes shape from a biology immune 
system perspective, where the aspiration is to develop a system to recognize the attack 
and propose a healing solution. The host related information is used to construct the 
attack graphs. The graphs are constructed and clustering is used to minimize the attack 
graphs for improved visualization. Danforth [43] uses the expert system Java Expert 
System Shell (JESS) to generate the attack graph and dot from the Graphviz project is 
used for graph visualization. The properties assessed are based on the abstract (attack) 
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classes of the networks. Danforth does not provide direct recommendation, but provides 
what-if scenarios relative to mitigation techniques for an administrator to gain insight 
when potential vulnerabilities are within the system. Danforth evaluates this work using 
986 hosts. 
Cheng et al.  
Cheng et al. [44] proposed a compression technique for representing attack graphs 
using reference encoding. A Jaccard similarity coefficient is utilized to determine the 
degree of similarity between vulnerabilities on various hosts. Host connectivity and 
known vulnerabilities are  used as parameter input for attack graph construction. Attack 
graphs are used to visualize attack paths. A hierarchical approach is  used to generate the 
attack graph. There are  no specific tools highlighted for construction. The properties that 
are analyzed are the similarity between the hosts. Recommendation techniques are not 
presented for improving network security. Cheng et al. [44]  conducted simulation using 
BRITE and GT-ITM; followed by injecting vulnerability information into the generated 
graphs. Results indicate 263 topological graphs generated with host ranging from 60 to 
1,023.  
Williams et al.  
Williams et al. [45] proposed a new cascading approach to the visualization of attack 
graph display. This improved work presents a simplified layout of the previous MP graph 
by collapsing the state nodes, as well as omitting the prerequisite and vulnerability 
instances. This improved visualization provides either general reachability or the view of 
the attack graph in which to view the interaction with the network. The former depicts the 
ingoing and outgoing reachability and corresponding edges that can be reached or reach 
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the selected node. The latter depicts the edges indicating the shortest attack paths between 
the sets of nodes.  
Williams et al. [45] presented an efficient engine that generates attack graphs step-by-
step and provides an interactive opportunity to trace the attacker's path. The computation 
module is written in C++ for speed, while the visualization module is implemented in 
Java, which loads the NetSPA engine as a library. It is targeted to the analyses of trust 
relationships the attacker exploits at each step. This work was evaluated using a small 
network containing 250 hosts, 3,777 ports, and over 8,500 vulnerabilities. 
2.6 Game Theory 
In this section, an overview of game theory is provided to capture the essence of 
game models, as well as relevant research systems developed to capture the attacker and 
defender exchanges. There is considerable research involving the use of game theory and 
network security. Game theory demonstrates an advantage of modeling the interactions 
between attackers and defenders. He et al. [46] proposed a novel Game Theoretical 
Attack-Defense Model (GTADM), which quantifies the probability of threats in order to 
construct a risk assessment framework. The focus is on the computation of the attack 
probability according to the cost-benefit of the attacker and the defender, and defined 
relevant metrics to quantify the payoff matrix.  
Alpcan and Basar [47] presented a game theoretic analysis of intrusion detection in an 
access control environment. Several common metrics were used to help identify the 
performance of the Intrusion Detection System. Using the metrics they provided, 
simulation was used to determine the costs and actions of the attacker and IDS.  
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In this research, game theory and game model development research is used as the 
basis to disseminate attacker and defender strategy spaces for defenses within an 
organization. Game models are developed and stored in relationship to web based attacks.  
2.7 Current Technologies  
In this section, current research related technologies are presented to evaluate open 
source static and dynamic code analysis tools with sql injection, cross site scripting, and 
file inclusion web attacks. These tools are used within this research to analyze key 
features of capturing internal and external attack information, as well as how the 
information is presented to the system administrator. 
AMNESIA 
Halfond et al. [48] developed the AMNESIA project towards the prevention of SQL 
Injection attack by combining static analysis and runtime monitoring. The static portion 
of AMNESIA uses program analysis to build a model of the legitimate queries that are 
potentially generated by the application. The dynamic portion of AMNESIA ensures 
compliance with the static modeled portion by monitoring the dynamically generating 
queries during runtime for a successful match. In the event the dynamically generated 
queries fail validation, the query is reframed from execution.  This model assists with 
preventing SQL injection attacks and provides a feedback mechanism for notification. 
PANACEA 
Bolzoni et al. [49] proposed a method to automatically and systematically classify 
detected attacks for anomaly-based intrusion detection systems. This work provided the 
ability to extract information from an attack, compute similarities of attack data 
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information, and classify it accordingly respectively either autonomous or semi-
autonomous.  
STRANGER 
Stranger [50] is a python based tool, which uses a Pixy front-end. It is a static 
vulnerability analysis tool for PHP that performs taint analysis to identify potentially 
vulnerable sinks (sinks that depend on external inputs) relative to SQL injection, cross-
site scripting, and malicious file execution attacks. Stranger generates dependency graphs 
that show how the external inputs flow into the sinks. Stranger then performs string 
analysis on the dependency graphs. Stranger also uses the automata package MONA tool 
to store the automata constructed during string analysis symbolically. 
Stranger takes a PHP web application as input and outputs potential vulnerabilities, as 
well as a model dependency graph. Stranger works by modeling the PHP program and 
detecting cases where user generated input gets forwarded on to the database. 
Unfortunately, at times Stranger is unable to completely model certain applications, but 
provides a good foundation for developers to begin improvement during code review 
sessions. 
In this dissertation the Stranger tool is highlighted to compare with AVOIDIT IRS, 
considering there were a limited number of open-source tools available to conduct 
research. The Stanger tool is used against large projects, as well as AVOIDIT IRS, to 
capture the results from both tools for analysis. The PHP web applications used were all 
open source. The tools used were a common blogging management tool WordPress, a 
content management tool Joomla, and a project management tool dotProject. Stranger 
completed scanning the Joomla application in approximately ten minutes without any 
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errors. Stranger found zero SQLI vulnerabilities, eighty-three XSS vulnerabilities, and 
over two hundred more potential file inclusion issues, which all seem to be related to 
unmodeled functions. Scanning the dotProject, Stranger took approximately thirty 
minutes after a few attempts. It located seven events tagged as SQLI vulnerabilities, 
mainly within "organizer.php" accepting values without strong sanitation. Scanning the 
DotProject also uncovered over four hundred XSS vulnerabilities and two hundred file 




Figure 1: Example dotProject Modeled Graph 
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Finally, scanning the WordPress application took a considerable amount of time and 
was unable to complete the scan due to the resource capacity. Stranger discovered zero 
SQLI vulnerabilities, fifty XSS vulnerabilities, and fifty file inclusion issues. Of those 
investigated, unmodeled functions and parameters specified in protected configuration 
files dominated these findings. Figure 2 captures STRANGER’s inability to fully model 













Figure 2: Example WordPress Unmodeled Graph 
 
CVE CHECKER 
CVE Checker [50] is a vulnerability scanner like tool written in C that  discovers 
installed versions of software on a system in an attempt to locate CVEs associated to 
potential identified software targets. The CVE Checker scans and reports the installed 
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software on a system and pulls the CVEs from the NIST repository. CVE Checker does 
not provide security for the system it is installed on, but acts as a notification tool to warn 
a user of new vulnerabilities that arise. 
CVE Checker is utilized as a command line tool to identify software based on simple 
rules added through community involvement. It requires libxslt to convert the input XML 
file from the national vulnerability database into comma separated values for easy 
importation into a sqlite3 database. Figure 3 depicts CVE Checker capturing software 
loaded on the system. 
 
 
Figure 3: CVE Checker Software  
 
Once the CVE Checker has identified the software and associated CVEs have been 
imported into the database, the CVE Checker has the ability to notify the user of potential 
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areas of concern from imported CVEs. Figure 4 highlights the identified CVEs associated 
to an installed Java SE package. 
 
 
Figure 4: CVE Checker Vulnerability Notification  
 
 
In this dissertation the CVE Checker tool is presented to compare with AVOIDIT IRS, 
wherein the CVE Checker captures the CVE related information for notification purposes 
in an open source fashion. Given the facts the CVE Checker is written in C and is a 
command line tool, it notifies the user of all CVE vulnerability information associated to 
installed software in less than 10 seconds on a Ubuntu 4GB of RAM virtual machine in 
Parellels. The CVE Checker can be used for small organizations, as well as AVOIDIT 
IRS, to capture CVE related information from an installed system. The CVE Checker 
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differs from the AVOIDIT IRS, where the CVE Checker is only a notification tool and 
the AVOIDIT IRS classifies the CVEs and proposes a defense strategy. 
In this chapter, attack and vulnerability taxonomies were discussed, as well as 
ontology and mining algorithm related research. We also provided game theory and 
attack graph related research, followed by current technologies evaluated within this 
research. These areas of research encompass the motivation of the development of the 
AVOIDIT IRS.  
3. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY 
This chapter presents the proposed methodology used to develop the AVOIDIT Issue 
Resolution System (AIRS). AIRS uses the output of application monitoring, third party 
vulnerability data collection, and asset risk assessment as the a priori knowledge to assist 
the network administrator to make an educated decision on how to handle a potential 
attack. It further provides the ability to retrieve game decision models associated to the 
identified attack. The first step in the development of the AIRS was to extract 
information CVEs from the National Vulnerability Database, as the initial corpus. The 
use of web logs gain knowledge of an application breaches. Knowledge engineering 
using security experts was applied to the corpus to determine rules and information 
formatting for attack vector classification. 
3.1 AVOIDIT IRS Architecture and Information Extraction Process 
This dissertation focuses on the development of an ontology based issue resolution 
system (AIRS) with the ability to classify attack vector related information using an 
attack taxonomy [1B]. The aim of this AIRS takes the capacity of a knowledge base to 
store and retrieve attack information for cyber attack analysis using a holistic approach. 
In this holistic approach the AIRS is one component of GIDA, acting as the facilitator of 
attack knowledge. In this dissertation attention is placed on AIRS’s ability to retrieve 
game decision models associated to the identified attack. Figure 5 highlights the game 
















Figure 5: Game Inspired Defense Architecture (GIDA) 
 
GIDA aims to protect target systems and networks employing game theoretic defense 
strategies and executing the same for securing against probable and committed attacks. 
GIDA assesses candidate game models for a particular attack identified by AIRS and 
executes the optimal game model. As depicted in figure 5, the network is connected to 
the Internet via sensors and actuators. Sensors are tools such as intrusion detection 
systems, log parsers, etc. used to analyze traffic associated to monitored systems and 
applications. Actuators are tools such as firewalls, switches, routers, etc., which forward 
traffic accordingly, pursuant to rules identified, for defense measures. The Honeypot is 
incorporated in GIDA to transfer suspicious behavior for further analysis of attacker 
interactions with pseudo systems. GIDA uses AIRS to apprise itself of the various 
characteristics of a potential attack. The GIDA control unit has the capacity to capture 
AIRS 
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input from information received and take an appropriate action for defense or engage 
AIRS for supplemental attack identification and game selection.  
AIRS will increase organizational awareness of cyber attacks and how to 
appropriately correlate defenses. The use of web logs will be used to gain knowledge of 
an application breach. Common Vulnerability Exposures (CVEs) are used to capture 
vulnerabilities and associated information for potential solutions within the repository. 
IDS log files will be used to capture packet related signatures. An event correlation 
algorithm will be implemented to identify frequent patterns and sequential events from 
the various sources identified. The algorithm uses a depth first search to construct the 
trees based on classified attack vector information from previous trees exhibiting the 
parent-child node relationship. This provides a comprehensive tool used to investigate 
anomalous activity in a local network setting related to the patterns of attack inception. 
The accuracy of attack classification will improve an organization’s attack defense reuse, 
as the knowledge of cyber attacks increase. Figure 6 shows the overall structure of the 
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Figure 6: AVOIDIT IRS Architecture 
 
1. Acquire Attack data from test network. 
Information is gathered from a test network via an intrusion detection system, 
firewall, or directly from application level logs.  
2. MS Log Parser Tool [51] and ApacheLogIterator [52] 
Log data is capable of recording important events, which should be analyzed on 
an ongoing basis, consistent with the monitoring of other key centralized security 
controls [53]. MS Log Parser [51] tool was developed to parse recorded events 
that have occurred in a system and/or application. It contains a core SQL engine 
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facilitating the use of data repository for further analysis. MS Log Parser enables 
turning large amounts unstructured text into a form (in a database) that can be 
manipulated to understand patterns, relationships, and meanings by a computer 
agent. ApacheLogIterator [52] is a simple Apache log file parser, which extends 
the SPLFileObject php class. The ApacheLogIterator uses this functionality to 
simply read the raw data from the file into a structured array. 
2. Acquire Attack data from vulnerability databases 
Information can also be gathered from knowledge bodies such as CERT and CVE. 
Attack vector information is retrieved from external repositories for classification 
by the AVOIDIT Algorithm. 
3. Classify via AVOIDIT Algorithm 
Utilizing the AVOIDIT taxonomy, a PHP based application is used to retrieve 
parsed information captured from the log parser tool. The classification of attack 
details will be used within a knowledge base setting to extract defense strategies 
through terms and relations from a large corpus.   
4. Attack Vector Store 
Attack Vector Store begins the transition to directly communicate with the 
knowledge base. The  knowledge base will allow an organization to learn from 
past, present, and future attacks. 
5. Ontology Processing 
An ontology is an explicit specification of concepts related to a specific domain 
and the relationships amongst those concepts to create an organized knowledge 
base. Ontology is a common way to organize knowledge and involves the 
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description of objects and relationships [16]. The ontology processing will capture 
attack details into the knowledge base to begin attack analysis. 
6. Content Analysis and Extraction 
Content analysis and extraction will utilize the information within the knowledge 
repository to begin concept association in an organization. 
7. Ontology Relationship 
AVOIDIT IRS ontology is the representation of attack concepts (AVOIDIT) as it 
relates to capturing attack data within a knowledge base and its association to 
cyber security within an organization. Figure 5 highlights AVOIDIT’s use within 
the knowledge base. The complete ontology relationship enables communication 
for all functional areas within the organization to become resilient in combating 
security threats. 
8. Issue Resolution Communication Output via User Interface 
The complete issue resolution application is used to provide a heuristic to cyber 
security breaches within an organization. The user interface will provide a concise 
central location for the organization to capture and disseminate attack details for 
defense resolutions. 
 
This research will measure precision in multiple forms. A correct classification of an 
attack vector and its associated information will be measured by AIRS’s ability to 
autonomously map to an attack. In the event a node is discovered to contain no defense 
for a particular attack vector, further investigation may be warranted from a security 
expert or network administrator pinpointing a defense and/or complete classification in 
all categories. This method involves manually classifying the attack vector details with 
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aspirations of it being used for future defense. Previous work [54] has highlighted the use 
of simple logistic regression classifier, trained on a hand-evaluated sample set, to 
automatically classify vulnerabilities.  
3.2 Information Extraction 
The first step involved eliciting relevant information from security experts to identify 
the vital content when assessing a cyber incident [1A]. Ten (10) security expert interviews 
and questionnaires were conducted to elicit experiential knowledge. The use of knowledge 
engineering was used to extract security expert knowledge to solidify concept 
relationships associated to cyber incident communication. The security experts were given 
separate CVEs from the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) and interviewed 
regarding the important factors of a CVE and its associated connection within an 
organization. Questions were asked based on the literature discussing discovery, reporting, 
and countermeasures when a potential attack is discovered. Table 1 consists of the 
questions that were asked to the security professionals. 
 
Table 1. Security Expert Questionnaire 
Discovery What is the common vulnerability exposure (CVE) report number 
you have selected? 
 Using the provided CVE report, please provide terms that are 
useful when distinguishing an attack.  
 Does the CVE present a complete path to an attack? 
 Do you believe there are distinct paths to information security 
compromises? 
 Generally, do attack paths progress from information gathering 
(probes) to targeted attacks? [55] 





Table 1. Security Expert Questionnaire (Continued) 
Reporting How would you determine if the data presented in the CVE is 
relevant to your organization? 
 What factors would you use to distinguish the level of importance 
within a CVE? 
 What are the factors that you identify when determining a 
security breach within your organization is of high importance? 
Countermeasures What managerial, organizational, and environmental factors lead 
to better countermeasures within an organization? [55] 
 What managerial factors can reduce an attacker’s attraction 
toward a targeted system? [55] 




Are there any further details you believe should be mentioned 
relating to discovering, reporting, or countering attacks? 
 Do you believe there is a necessity to develop a system to assist 
those less familiar with security breaches? 
 Are there any systems you believe will assist a novice with 
understanding various aspects of security breaches? 
 With your understanding of security, do you believe the current 
security terms capture a complete picture to successfully transfer 
knowledge within an organization? 
 Does the Ontology depicted provide an appropriate organization 
of information relevant to security? 
 
Results of the expert interviews revealed that the experts were interested in the 
following categories of security incidents: (1) whether the incident involves software in 
use, (2) accurately classified incident, (3) the risk factors associated to the incident, and (4) 
historical performance. The highlighted categories made up the two sets of information 
extraction rules. Simmons [56] utilized a similar strategy to extract pertinent information 
from business reports.  
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Two major rules were created to extract security incident information from the CVEs.  
The rules were created in pseudo code for clarity and programmed into AIRS. The 
security experts identified the classification accuracy, risk factors, whether the software is 
in use, and the historical performance.  The pseudo code was then programmed into AIRS 
to extract information for each major rule. In order to ensure AIRS extracts useful 
information, security experts who regularly analyze common vulnerability and exposures 
provided their analysis of relevant information of interest. Rule 1 denotes the software 
incidents and its respective cause and results if the incident is successful. Rule 2 
intuitively provides the organization a high level view of the type of vulnerability 
extracted from a CVE present in the vulnerable application.  See Table 2 for the two sets 
of extraction rules. 
 
Table 2. CVE Information Extraction Major Rule Sets 






for each row in the portion of the CVE from which we want to extract 
information  
if the keyword is a candidate indicating software incidents within an 
organization (e.g.,  Joomla, Wordpress, Drupal) 
then return the keyword noun phrase  
and return verb phrase immediately following the keyword and 
present them software incidents (e.g. verb phrases-allow, allows) 
                if keyword is a verb phrase denoting cause (e.g. disabled)  
then return the verb phrase and following noun phrases as reasons 
if keyword is a verb phrase indicating result (e.g. read, execute, 
inject, include) 





Table 2. CVE Information Extraction Major Rule Sets (Continued) 






for each row in the portion of the CVE from which we want to extract 
information  
if the keyword is a candidate indicating a vulnerability incident within an 
organization (e.g.,  SQL Injection, XSS, Directory Traversal) 
then return the keyword phrase  
and return the phrase immediately following the keyword and 
present them as cyber incident  






The rules identified in the above table apply information extraction methods to extract 
meaningful pre- and post-conditions from the unstructured text descriptions available in a 
national vulnerability database. A brief analysis of these descriptions proposes that they 
follow quasi-regular patterns contained within a CVE (vulnerability [W] → in target [X] 
→ allows [Y] attacker → to [Z]). In this way, the verb-noun phrases and their relations 
can be extracted and classified with pre- and post-conditions predefined in a knowledge 
base. Considering the highly specific descriptions presented within a CVE makes it a 
great fit for applying word and entity disambiguation methods as described in [57, 58]. 
This will ensure that natural language variation is effectively handled and novel concepts 
are identified for ontology extension. 
The primary evaluation will be done using attack data from web logs, which is sent 
through an analysis algorithm to determine the appropriate classification. The analysis 
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algorithm consists of a frequent pattern matching algorithm, which constructs the 
sequence of the complete path to an attack.  We import web server instances from the log 
files. Figure 7 depicts a log file being loaded into AIRS with filtered events. 
 
 
Figure 7: Internal Log Server Events 
 
 
Secondary evaluation will be performed by comparing CVE previous vulnerability 
information to determine how well AVOIDIT classifies in comparison. Both evaluations 
would be in accordance to the importance levied by high level experts. The external 








The primary and secondary evaluations will allow a determination of the applicability 
of AVOIDIT and how well it is able to capture and disseminate according to the original 
requirements proposed by experts.  By performing various analyses on the results, it will 
be established whether the prototype tool effectively captures relevant knowledge and 
whether it will effectively assist organizations with improving cyber attack awareness and 
defense. 
We use PHP for the custom scripting and visual representation. PHP is a free server-
side HTML embedded scripting language with numerous modules. It has reliable cURL 
functionality to extract and manipulate data from the Web, as well as the support for 
retrieving third-party data. Using minimal code will allow third-party data to be 
incorporated into the AVOIDIT IRS where PHP is used to extract and print text from 
data patterns that are matched.   
 52 
3.3 AVOIDIT: A Cyber Security Taxonomy 
AVOIDIT is a cyber attack taxonomy that classifies attack components by attack 
vectors, operational impact, defense, informational impact, and target [23]. Traditionally, 
IT communities refer to the properties of confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) 
to gauge the level in which the attack has impacted the target. In AVOIDIT we use the 
informational impact, which incorporates CIA properties, for assessment. 
A taxonomy that satisfies the mutually exclusive requirement is difficult. A solution to 
this critique is to place multiple associations of an attack in a tree structure, providing a 
parent child relationship that is explained below. AVOIDIT was developed to provide, 
through an application, a knowledge repository schema used by a defender to classify 
vectors that an attacker can use against a target. Figure 9 provides an overview of 
AVOIDIT to support comprehension of each attack classification and how a variety of 
attacks are represented in each category. Simmons et al. [1F] highlighted each definition 
with each attack classification. 
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Figure 9: AVOIDIT - A Cyber Attack Taxonomy [1F] 
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AVOIDIT provides a more apparent approach to educate the defender on attack 
vectors used to launch attacks. AVOIDIT classifies attacks in a tree structure, including 
the allusive blended attack.  Using an attack tree provides a systematic method of 
characterizing a variety of attacks and enumerates the ways an attack could occur. This is 
done using the cause, action, defense, analysis, and target (CADAT) process used to 
classify attacks. Predecessors [8, 14] state that providing a tree-like structure is a solution 
to blended attacks, but claim this particular structure can become unorganized. AVOIDIT 
is proposed in a tree structure, which successfully classifies common vulnerabilities and 
cyber attacks to provide defenders with in-depth information required to create defense 
solutions.  Each path on the attack tree represents a unique attack. Figure 10 provides 
insight into how a tree structure can be converted into a searchable schema classifying a 
multitude of attacks. By using a parent-child relationship, AVOIDIT displays how multi-
staged attacks can be captured, classified, and disseminated. Figure 10 provides a small 
depiction of the initial attack vector being the parent, which is classified using a tree 
structure, including the remaining classifiers, which are omitted. The secondary and 
following attack vectors are used as child nodes that comprise how the attack was 
successful in its exploitation. Each node contains a unique ID that helps identify the 














Figure 10: AVOIDIT Tree-like Structure 
 
Once an attack is recognized, AVOIDIT uses the cause, action, defense, analysis, and 
target (CADAT) process to classify attacks against a particular target. The CADAT 
process consists of the following using AVOIDIT: 
1. Classify the attack vector. Understand the cause in which the attack came to 
fruition. 
2. Classify the operational impact. The type of action conducted resulting from the 
impact the attack vector enabled to take place (i.e. Trojan horse) 
3. Classify the potential defense. Understand how to properly defend using 
preventative and/or reactive methods to a potential attack. 
4. Classify the informational impact. This step provides an analysis for reporting 
purposes to what damages have or may take place once the attack is successful. 
5. Classify the target to which the defense is sought. This step properly identifies the 
target in which the attack seeks to compromise. 
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Although, the CADAT process is not final, due to different roles having various 
levels of understanding of an attack, it is a good start for research. For instance, support 
personnel may log the operational impact first, prior to involving the network 
administrator. The process for classifying attacks using CADAT enables the entire 
organization to gain common security knowledge to become vigilant in defending against 





Figure 11: AIRS Tree Structure 
Simmons et al. [1E] utilized the preventative anti-computer forensics framework to 
provide a data fusion [59] and anomaly [60] point of view in predicting, correlating, 
analyzing, and disseminating adversary actions and their impact when constructing a 
complete path to an attack. Figure 12 highlights the iterative process within the PACF 
framework. This process can be used within organizations to prevent the use of anti-




Figure 12: Preventative Anti-Computer Forensics (PACF) Framework 
The initial phase is the acquisition phase that begins the process of information 
extraction. Data is constantly analyzed in preparation for presentation. Once the 
information is presented with some level of accuracy, a deterrence is implemented to 
prevent future occurrences. Following the deterrence phase, we move forward with 
creating a baseline of all the activities that were captured and disseminated within the 
organization. We envision this framework to be an iterative process to continuously 
capture information where administrators are privy to the latest information involving 
probable attacks by detecting anomalies. 
3.4 AVOIDIT IRS Ontological Representation 
AVOIDIT IRS is developed for small and medium sized organizations to improve 
communication and reuse of defenses until the potential attack has been mitigated and/or 
remediated. Figure 13 provides an overview of AVOIDIT IRS ontology to support 
comprehending communication flow within an organization upon attack discovery. The 
objective of the security ontology is to provide knowledge representation of the most 
 58 
relevant security concepts within an organization. Gruber [61] has provided a set of 
criterion to ensure best the developed ontology is useful, which are: (i) clarity, (ii) 
coherence, (iii) extendibility, (iv) minimal encoding bias, and (v) minimal ontological 
commitment. 
 
associatedWith – who assigns a task 
has/have – information needed to complete superclass.  The direction is 
one-way. 
is – an option associated with a higher level concept.  
consistOf – is the superclass concept that contains vital subclass 
relationship. 
approvedBy – who approves 
influencedBy – the associated impact 










































Now, let us consider an organization running an online booking PHP based application 
connected to a MySQL server database. An incident is discovered by the defender, 
wherein an attacker is attempting to assess the MySQL server using a SQL injection 
vulnerability via an online booking application. The defender is able to view the SQL 
injection attempts via the web server log file. The defender uses the national vulnerability 
database to see if any new incidents have been reported, however it will take the defender 
a significant amount of time to discern if a fix is available.  
AIRS provides an ontological representation of the cyber incident and the 
communication involved to educate the defender of the current state of the system. It uses 
pull technology to bring the information to the defender without having to search for 
suggestive countermeasures. Continuing our example, using AIRS, the SQL Injection 
vulnerability targets a vulnerability in a PHP application version 3.2, which has a defense 
influenced by a high complexity. AIRS identifies that a CVE does not exist and uses 
historical data to determine the defense as Block IP address, until a fix has been 
established. Therefore, the defense is influenedBy the complexity of the SQL Injection 
vulnerability. The complexity is also influencedBy the resources available to defend or 
repair the vulnerability, pending approvalBy the sales organization. Once the AVOIDIT 
portion of the ontology is populated with the necessary vulnerability information, AIRS 
communicates within the entire organization for proper allocation of resources and 
approvals. This offers a framework for organizational awareness and its impact when a 
cyber incident has taken place. We illustrate the necessary AIRS ontology concepts using 
figure 13. 
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3.5 Correlating Logs and External Vulnerabilities 
Prior research [7] has mentioned the need to improve security taxonomies by 
classifying blended attacks. In this work I implement a frequent and sequential pattern 
algorithm to solve the blended attack hurdle with taxonomies by applying attack vector 
information in the taxonomy to attack graphs. I apply this analysis to log files. I also 
utilize word and entity disambiguation, along with keyword searches, to retrieve and 
classify pertinent CVE related information. In the event that log instances or CVEs are 
not fully classified, the administrator is notified. This data is correlated with historical 
data related to log entry patterns and targets associated to CVEs. In the event log or CVE 
events are not autonomously linked, the administrator is notified and provided the ability 
to classify manually in order to allow the system to begin correlating ambiguous 
instances. Considering the massive number of CVEs, focus was placed on real world 
scenarios, where a company uses a web based content management system, such as 
Joomla, Wordpress, etc. Figure 14 shows how log instances are queued for classification, 
as well as accepting/rejecting links to CVEs. 
 
 
Figure 14: AIRS Classification and Correlation 
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In prior research [1C], we conducted a preliminary experiment using CVEs from the 
National Vulnerability Database for classification. The first step involved a training set of 
60 positive CVEs associated with Joomla to assist with the learning process. Figure 15 
depicts a CVE specific to Joomla, which describes the vulnerability information. The 
algorithm was trained using a standard unigram bag of words approach. In each CVE 
description, experiential knowledge was used to classify the concepts of interests from the 
text relative to attack vector, operational impact, defense, informational impact, and target.  
 
 
Figure 15: CVE Vulnerability Description 
 
The second step involved a test set of 100 unique CVEs associated with Joomla and 50 
random CVEs (for noise) associated with various open and closed source software. The 
goal is to ensure Joomla related CVEs are correctly classified and distinguished from 
irrelevant CVEs. Performing this step simulates data being pushed to the user via 
AVOIDIT IRS providing specific attack vector information. Preliminary evaluation on 
this minimal dataset highlighted the algorithm’s ability to correctly classify application 
pertinent incidents specific to an organization. Precision was used to measure the accuracy 
in which the classification algorithm was able to correctly classify attack vector 
information. Precision was measured by dividing the total number of correctly classified 
items by the total number of extracted items. Recall was also used to measure the 
percentage of available correct information extracted. Recall highlights the algorithms 
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ability to extract relevant information. Recall is the number of correctly classified items 
divided by the total possible to be correctly extracted. In Table 3 the precision and recall 
are computed for both the training set and test set using the classification algorithm. 
 
Precision =  Total correctly classified    (1) 
   Total extracted 
 
Recall =     Total correctly classified   (2) 
   Total possible to be correctly extracted 
 
Table 3. Algorithm Precision and Recall Computation 
 CVEs Correctly Classified Precision Recall 
Training 
Set 
47/60 78.3% 78.3% 
Test Set 92/100 92% 92% 
 
We further trained Joomla, Wordpress, and dotProject related events. After these 
events have been trained and stored in the repository, as historical data, we apply our 
classifier to newly discovered/imported events. Imported events are treated as probes 
against the system and compared against each of the five (5) classification types, as 
described in AVOIDIT above. The events are classified using pre-defined keywords, as 
described above, that provides the best match (e.g., “sql injection” to “insufficient input 
validation”).  
Considering, it was extremely difficult to obtain a considerable number of public 
attacks, the decision was made to create an automated attack environment using Selenium 
and Metasploit. Selenium [62] is used as an automation tool to create automated scripts 
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that allow for persistent session management, whereas Metasploit [63] is used as a 
penetration testing tool. Therefore, in the remaining portion of this work, we use the 
following CVEs that were associated to several attack modules in Metasploit. This 
enables the ability of showing AIRS being able to associate log files with CVEs to alert 
an administrator of potential attacks. The following CVEs will be highlighted in this 
research: 
• CVE-2007-4184 (Base Score 7.5) 
• CVE-2006-4234 (Base Score 7.5) 
• CVE-2008-3886 (Base Score 4.3) 
• CVE-2006-6808 (Base Score 6.8) 
• CVE-2006-2667 (Base Score 7.5) 
3.6 ID3 Algorithm Implementation for Defense Notification 
The ID3 algorithm, developed by Ross Quilan in 1987 [64], is a simple algorithm 
used in AIRS to notify the defender whether to defend or not to defend. The ID3 
algorithm builds a decision tree using a fixed set of examples for future samples. This 
algorithm applies a top-down, greedy search, through the examples given, which provides 
a low false positive rate and a high false negative rate. Table 4 provides an example of 
the ID3 algorithm attributes used in AIRS. The attributes and their values for the ID3 
implementation are: 
AV = {misconfiguration (MC), insufficient validation (IV), buffer overflow (BO), 
insufficient authentication (IA), design flaw (DF), incorrect permission (IP) } 
OI = { misuse of resources (MoR), user compromise (UC), web compromise 
(WC),  installed malware (IM),  denial of service (DoS) } 
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D = { Patch System (PS), Correct Code (CC), Remove From Network (RFN) } 
I = { distort, disrupt, destruct, disclose, discover } 
T = { joomla, wordpress, dotProject }  
severity = { high, medium, low } 
 
Table 4. ID3 Decision Tree Training Data 






















WC PS Disclose joomla High Yes 


































RC PS Distort dotProject High Yes 
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To make relative decision related to defend or not to defend, we use the entropy and 
information gain for prediction. For the table 4 example, we compute the entropy below, 
as well as provide the calculation for gain. 
 
Entropy(S)   =   −  (6/10)  Log2  (6/10)   −   (4/10)  Log2  (4/10)   =   0.971 
Gain(S,A)   =   Entropy(S)   −   S  ((|S!|  /  |S|)  x  Entropy(S!)) 
Where:  
S is each value v of all possible values of attribute A 
S! = subset of S for which attribute A has value i 
|S!| = number of elements in S! 
|S| = number of elements in S 
In the event a classification attribute value is unknown, we assign a probability based 
on the frequency associated with the classified values. A more elaborate list of the ID3 
training tree can be found in Appendix D. 
3.7 Attack Graph Probability  
The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is an open framework used to 
standardize vulnerability scores [65]. The CVSS consists of three groups: Base, Temporal 
and Environmental. In this work, focus is placed on the base score, which is a cumulative 
score of the vulnerability relative to the access vector, access complexity, and 
authentication. 
The CVSS base score is used relative to the CVE, as well as if the CVE has been 
correlated with any log file, for analyzing a sequential attack path. The information is 
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used to determine the probability of whether an attacker utilizes a child node within an 
attack graph to successfully launch an attack. The system uses its historical data to assist 
the defender in determining whether to defend or not to defend. In the event a log 
instance is correlated with a CVE, it does not necessarily mean an attack has been 
successful, but provides the administrator the ability to ensure his system is patched by 
raising a flag. The probability of the attack is determined using the exponential 
distribution and normalized using the following cases: 
Case 1: Log instances present in log file associated to CVEs 
In the event a log instance is associated to a CVE, we set the system flag to 1, 
otherwise 0, and compute the probability in the following fashion: 
bs: is a vector of the base score contained within the CVE (i.e. [7.5, 6, 5.5, …n]). 
L: is a vector of the flag being set within a log file associated to a CVE (each 
L!  ϵ  {0,1}). 




Pr(bs!)   =   1 
Case 2: Log instances are not present in log file associated to CVEs 
In this case we do not use the system flag; considering setting the system flag to 0 
will result in an evenly distributed probability. Therefore, we use a cumulative score and 
take the probability associated to the severity of the CVE base score. We compute the 
probability in the following fashion where bs is the CVE Base Score: 
 
Pr(bs!)   =   1 
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In this chapter, we provided the attack taxonomy that is proposed as an enhancement 
based on prior taxonomies. In doing so, the CADAT process is defined, as well as the 
ontology proposed for efficient organization communication. Our PACF framework is 
utilized, as well as the information extraction techniques to classify internal and external 
vulnerabilities, followed by correlating these events. We follow this up with the use of an 
attack graph and how we compute the probability of the attacker using a child node 
towards a successful attack. The next chapter will explore the implementation aspects of 
these topics. 
4. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS 
This chapter presents the implementation details regarding event correlation within 
the issue resolution system. The implementation details involve the knowledge base, 
classification algorithm, virtual machines, and web applications corresponding to 
hardware and software.  
Cyber attack management is critical in the application of AVOIDIT. Any attack 
vector can be malformed to perform some gratuitous action to a system. Utilizing 
AVOIDIT (Figure 9) with the tree structure (Figure 10), created an issue resolution 
system. AVOIDIT IRS is a knowledge base tool that enables an organization to create a 
formalized apparatus to communicate seamlessly regarding the discovery of attacks and 
defenses. It uses AVOIDIT as the basis for its repository schema to classify the entire 
path of an attack. AVOIDIT IRS is not an intrusion detection system, but works together 
with an IDS. Figure 16 highlights AVOIDIT IRS applied on a local network. Following 
the architecture of the proposed system, attack examples are provided describing the use 
of an attack based issue resolution system, its proposed algorithm, and lastly the design 






















Figure 16: AVOIDIT IRS in a Local Network Environment 
 
 
More than ninety percent of web applications contain design related flaws that  can be 
readily exploited by hackers [66]. Considering the majority of attacks involve web-based 
vulnerabilities, AIRS places focus on cyber attacks. In a recent survey [67], it was found 
that eighty-five percentof cyber breaches were not difficult; of those ninety-six percent 
were preventable, and half of the vulnerabilities found stem from plugin applications. 
Therefore, with plugins playing a major part of vulnerabilities in cyber attacks, AIRS is 
able to store plugin related data to alert the administrator of potential compromises. 
Figure 16 provides the overall setup of the AVOIDIT IRS architecture, which consists of 
the external web-based vulnerabilities, a log parser, a classification algorithm, database, 
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and user interface. Following the architecture, the approach to discovery and 
dissemination within the issue resolution system is detailed.  
 
4.1 AIRS Experiment Setup 
In this section the experiment setup is discussed to understand how AIRS is able to 
operate in a near real world environment. Due to limited resources, virtual machines 
(VM) were used to virtualize software and its exploitation. Figure 17 depicts our virtual 




















The SamuraiWTF VMWare image containing Metasploit and other testing tools, 
including the target machines are all located on the same physical machine. The router is 
used only to depict the communication flow within the host machine IP address 
192.168.1__.1. The target/victim machines are displayed with the three IP addresses 
connected to the right of the router. The target machine with an IP address of 
192.168.1__.2 is loaded with Windows XP Service Pack 2. Concentration is placed on 
the target machine with an IP address of 192.168.1__.3, which is loaded with the Ubuntu 
based UltimateLAMP VMWare image containing our vulnerable web applications, 
Joomla, WordPress, and dotProject.  The target machine with an IP address of 
192.168.1__.4 is loaded with the Metasploitable Ubuntu 8.04 server install on a VMWare 
6.5 image, which mainly consists of networking vulnerabilities. AIRS was implemented 
on the target machine with the IP Address 192.168.1__.3 highlighted in blue.  
Considering there are numerous outdated attack data sets, such as DARPA and the 
PKDD2007, the decision was made to construct an automated attack test bed for the 
purposes of testing the AVOIDIT IRS. The current DARPA dataset has been criticized 
for being outdated [68], but remains a very popular dataset for intrusion detection 
analysis. Moreover, DARPA has recognized there remains a lack of efficient attack test 
beds to construct various attack scenarios and are in the development phase of the 
National Cyber Range, which is the National test bed for critical security research [69]. 
Therefore, several sets of attacks were created that  were derived from various sources to 
test the AVOIDIT IRS. These attacks stemmed mainly from open source web application 
within the UltimateLAMP project hosted on the vulnerable virtual machine as depicted in 
figure 15. The SAMURAI project (SWTF) is a web testing framework, which consists of 
multiple web applications testing tools to test a variety of hacking techniques.  
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The use of attack modules from the Metasploit project provided the majority of the 
attacks used against the web application projects within SWTF. For example, figure 18 
depicts an attack against a Joomla web application. The use of Metasploit 
joomla_tinybrowser module to conduct the attack and exploit a vulnerability in Joomla 
1.5.12 tinybrowser plugin. This particular attack is used to perform a file upload and 
execute arbitrary code on the targeted system. This Metasploit module connects to the 
target server and allows the attacker to upload a file without logging in. Once 
successfully connected to the server an attacker modifies the file name to prevent 
detection with the option to conduct further damage. 
 
 
Figure 18: Attack Test Bed 
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These attacks are utilized within the attack environment from open source web 
applications within the UltimateLAMP project using the following external cyber 
vulnerabilities: 
• CVE-2007-4184 (Base Score 7.5) – Joomla! 
• CVE-2006-4234 (Base Score 7.5) – dotProject 
• CVE-2008-3886 (Base Score 4.3) – dotProject 
• CVE-2006-6808 (Base Score 6.8) - Wordpress 
• CVE-2006-2667 (Base Score 7.5) - Wordpress 
4.2 AVOIDIT Issue Resolution System (AIRS) Interface 
The interface to AVOIDIT IRS will provide the user the ability to login and 
create/view notifications of current issues related to cyber security incidents. With AIRS 
the user is able to view reports involving hourly, daily, and monthly incidents. The user is 
able to view the health of the particular system in question involving the number of open 
tickets. The AIRS interface is able to display the complete path to an attack. It takes input 
from users and the log parser to retrieve probable attacks based on historical data. Further, 
from the input, AIRS outputs appropriate defenses to the attack. AIRS will capture the 
new threat probability based on attack vector and associated severity of the CVE relative 
to log file input. AVOIDIT IRS will be a comprehensive ticketing system related to cyber 
incidents and vulnerabilities.  
Codeigniter [74] is used as the development framework to provide a sophisticated 
user interface to the knowledgebase using PHP as the scripting language. Codeigniter is a 
fairly new Model View Controller (MVC) framework, which allows rapid web 
development and improved organization of dynamic sites. The initial Codeigniter 
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codebase was modified and extended to include features related to attack capture, 
classification, and correlation of events. Figure 19 is a screenshot of the proposed 
AVOIDIT IRS interface. 
 
 
Figure 19: AVOIDIT IRS User Interface 
 
 
AVOIDIT IRS Classification and Correlation Algorithms 
AVOIDIT Algorithm is used to classify attacks within the knowledge base tool. Once 
an attack is discovered a call is made to the classification algorithm that is used to classify 
attack vector information autonomously or manually via input from the administrator. 
After classification is complete, a call to the tree algorithm is made to retrieve all the 
information related to a particular attack vector. If the current node is a leaf node, then 
traverse up the tree until you reach a root node to determine the initial attack vector attack 
path. This algorithm uses a top-down approach to interpret the attack path by which an 
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attacker uses the initial attack vector to perform an attack. The parent node is the initial 
attack vector and the child nodes are the subsequent attack vectors that follow. 
The algorithm parses the data and uses the keyword matches within the repository to 
classify new attack vectors and their associated target. The algorithm retrieves the 
associated classifications for each keyword recognized within the repository. Table 5 
describes the notations used within the correlation algorithm. 
 
Table 5. Notations used in AVOIDIT Correlation Algorithm 
Notation Definition 
n Extracted string from a log 
cav! Classifications of previous attack vectors 
T Attack tree 
v Set of Vertices 
x Parent node 
 
Function classification (A simple data retrieval algorithm that is retrieved directly 
from repository) 
Algorithm 1. Classification Algorithm 
 
 
Input: a set of strings 𝑁. 
Output: A set of attack vectors 𝑐𝑎𝑣 names associated to set 
𝑁 and 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞 
 
The AVOIDIT Classification Algorithm 
 
1. for each 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁  
2.         if 𝑛! is at least one match 
3.          select all classifications 𝑐𝑎𝑣 including frequency 
4.         else if  
5.         for each variation of  𝑛!  //uses php pecl function 
6.                 select all classifications 𝑐𝑎𝑣 including 
frequency 
7.          end for 
8.         else 
9.          set 𝑛! → unclassified 
10.  end if 
11. end for 
12. retrun classifications 𝑐𝑎𝑣 and 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞 
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The logic behind the classification algorithm is to take a set of strings, whether it be 
from the description of a vulnerability alert or from a log file, and correlate them using 
keyword matches. The running time of the algorithm involves the retrieval of the attack 
vectors associated to the input. The best case scenario considers a constant linear time 
retrieval of the correlated attack vectors, including the frequency. The worst case scenario 
within the classification algorithm involves the retrieval of synonyms or a variation of the 
selected match. If synonym retrieval is required, the algorithm would remain linear with 
the multiplication of the synonyms included to retrieve the classified attack vector. As an 
alternative to ensure classification speed, a limit is placed on the variation of the keyword 
selected. The use of frequency enables a ranking mechanism to determine which variation 
has an increased probability of being the correctly selected match. 
 
Function attackTree using DFS 
Input: Text from the classification algorithm (n) and known classified attack vectors 
(cav!) 
Output: A row based output that simulates the complete path to an attack (Attack 
tree) 
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Algorithm 2. Attack Tree Algorithm 
 
 
The premise behind the attack tree portion of the algorithm is to provide a database 
scan of the classified attack vectors to retrieve the associated trees. If no tree exists, the 
attack vector becomes the root level for future related attack tree retrieval. If a tree exists 
for the classified attack vector, the child nodes are compared with other existing nodes. If 
a tree exists where two or more attack vectors contain the same parent, the attack trees are 
merged into one tree. 
This data is correlated with historical data relative to log entry patterns and targets 
associated to CVEs. If the event log or CVE events are not autonomously linked, the 
administrator is notified and provided the ability to classify manually in order to allow the 
system to begin correlating ambiguous instances. Considering the massive number of 
Input: a set of classified attack vectors CAV. 
Output: A set of attack trees 𝑇!"  that simulates the complete 
path of an attack. 
 
The AVOIDIT Tree Algorithm 
 
1. for each 𝑐𝑎𝑣! ∈ 𝐶𝐴𝑉  
2.     find corresponding attack Trees 𝑇! 
3.     if 𝑐𝑎𝑣! does not have a corresponding 𝑇! 
4.                 𝑐𝑎𝑣!   → 𝑇!"  
5.     else 
6.         Given a set of tree 𝑇!  !"  ! 
7.         for each 𝑇! 
8.             for all 𝑣   ∈ 𝑇!  
9.                 visited (𝑣) =   𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 
10.             for all 𝑣   ∈ 𝑇!  
11.                 if not visited (𝑣): 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑒  (𝑇!) 
12.            construct a tree 𝑇!" s.t. all v are covered for 𝑐𝑎𝑣! 
13.             set parent in 𝑇!"   of 𝑐𝑎𝑣!   → 𝑥!  
14.         end for 
15.     end if 
16. end for 
17. for all 𝑥!  !"  ! are equal 
18.     union 𝑇!" (𝑥! , 𝑥!!!) 
19. return a set of attack trees 𝑇!". 
 78 
CVEs, focus was placed on real world scenarios, where a company uses a web based 
content management system, such as Joomla, Wordpress, etc. Furthermore, plugins play a 
major part of vulnerabilities in cyber attacks, therefore AIRS is able to store plugin related 
data to alert the administrator of potential compromises. 
AIRS Ontology Implementation 
AVOIDIT IRS extracts cyber events’ ontological information corresponding to 
monitored web applications. An ontology can be considered a formal logic system of 
rules, concepts, concept taxonomies, relationships, properties, axioms and constraints 
[18]. Dalkir [70] proposed techniques used to elicit tacit knowledge codification within 
an organization using cognitive maps, decision trees, and knowledge taxonomies. 
Codification of knowledge allows the collection of knowledge to be shared and used 
within an organization. This provides good insight to constructing our ontology to ensure 
critical relationships are provided to capture knowledge beneficial for reuse. 
Mulwad et al. [71] proposed a framework for extracting unstructured information 
from text within external repositories, such as CVE, CCE, CPE, CVSS, OVAL, etc. They 
use Wikitology for its ontology conceptual model of cyber incidents and a computer 
security taxonomy from Wikipedia to classify vulnerabilities. The AVOIDIT IRS 
ontology is a formal representation of attack vector information, information relative to 
monitored web applications and key stakeholders, definitions associated to cyber 
incidents including mitigation/remediation resources and complexity.   
There is an increased complexity pertaining to the data storage of cyber attack 
information and its systematic approach to managing information. Knowledge 
management is a continuous developing field that remains full of research methodologies 
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to capture knowledge. Andrade and Saltz proposed a knowledge base management 
system that provides the capability of using an ontology-aware database management 
system [72]. This technique is useful as it provides a repository store framework for 
capture and dissemination of information. In this work, we develop a new ontology from 
a compilation of ontological research as represented in figure 13 above. 
Now, let us consider an organization running an online booking PHP based application 
connected to a MySQL server database. An incident is discovered by the defender, 
wherein an attacker is attempting to assess the MySQL server using an SQL injection 
vulnerability via the profiled online booking application. The defender is able to view the 
SQL injection attempts via the web server log file. The defender uses the national 
vulnerability database to see if any new incidents have been reported; however it will take 
the defender a significant amount of time to discern if a fix is available. 
AIRS offers an ontological representation of the cyber incident and the communication 
involved to educate the defender of the current state of the system. It uses pull technology 
to bring the information to the defender without having to search for suggestive 
countermeasures. Continuing our example, using AIRS, the SQL Injection vulnerability 
targets a vulnerability in a PHP application version 3.2 that  has a defense [influencedBy] 
a high complexity. AIRS identifies that a CVE does not exist and uses historical data to 
determine the defense as Block IP address, until a fix has been established. Therefore, the 
Defense is [influencedBy] the Complexity of the SQL Injection vulnerability. The 
Complexity is also [influencedBy] the Resources available to defend or repair the 
vulnerability, pending [approvalBy] the sales organization. Once the AVOIDIT portion of 
the ontology is populated with the necessary vulnerability information, AIRS 
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communicates within the entire organization for proper allocation of resources and 
approvals. This offers a framework for organizational awareness and its impact when a 
cyber incident has taken place. We illustrate the necessary AIRS concepts using figure 20. 
 
 
associatedWith – who assigns a task 
has/have – information needed to complete superclass.  The direction is 
one-way. 
is – an option associated with a higher level concept.  
consistOf – is the superclass concept that contains vital subclass 
relationship. 
approvedBy – who approves 
influencedBy – the associated impact 
 
Figure 20: AVOIDIT IRS Ontology Example 
 
In the next step AIRS extracts the ontology relationships from the various sources of 


































Table 6. Extracted Organizational AVOIDIT IRS Ontology 
Subject Predicate Concepts 
Booking 
Application associatedWith Sales Department 
Booking 
Application has Risks 
Booking 
Application has AVOIDIT Cyber Attack Taxonomy 
Booking 
Application has Resources 
Booking 
Application has Complexity 
AVOIDIT consistOf Attack Vector, Operational Impact, Defense, Information impact, and Target 
Attack Vector is Input Validation 
Operational 
Impact is Web Compromise 
Defense is Remove from Network 
Informational 
Impact is Disclosure 
Target is Application (Joomla) 
Defense influencedBy Complexity 
Complexity influencedBy  (Small) Project Size 
Complexity influencedBy  (High) Priority 
Complexity influencedBy  (Documented) Business Rules 
Resources has Person (Tim S.) 
Person (Tim S.) has Role (SE) 
Resources has Tool (SAT) 
Resources has Budget ($300) 




The AVOIDIT IRS implementation platform uses open-source development tools, 
such as PHP as the scripting language and MySQL as the database. Initially, a small 
application was created housing the classification algorithm using PHP with a MySQL 
database to store the keywords for classification as described in the preliminary tests in 
section 4.6. The preliminary scripts were extended for more sophisticated capabilities and 
custom interface using Silverstripe [73]. The Silverstripe CMS proved to be difficult to 
extend for customization. Therefore, the decision was made to migrate to Codeigniter for 
ease of use with closely related PHP scripts. The Codeigniter framework requires a web 
server install. To perform this capability, a simple XAMPP [75] install was done to 
incorporate Apache, MySQL, and PHP on a Toshiba Satellite 645D with 4GB of RAM, 
250GB hard drive, an Athlon II Dual Core. This setup was later migrated to a MacBook 
Pro with 16BB of RAM, Intel® Core I7 using MAMP [76] as the web server install. 
Although, any database could have been used for the knowledge base, I chose to 
remain with MySQL as the database for the Codeigniter repository. Further, I chose to 
use the MySQL Workbench 6.0 [77] as the database interface, as it provides a visual tool 
for database management, sql execution, data migration, and data modeling, to name a 
few features. MySQL Workbench provided a way for seamless updates and modeling 
relationships. Figure 21 provides a the MySQL Workbench view. Appendix B provides 
the full database model that was created. 
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Figure 21: MySQL Workbench 
 
Cyber Attack Classification and Scheme 
Table 7 provides insight into how a searchable schema is attained by classifying 
attacks using a tree structure. By using a parent-child relationship, AVOIDIT 
demonstrates how multi-staged attacks can be captured, classified, and disseminated. 
This information is utilized within AVOIDIT IRS. 
 
Table 7. Cyber Attack Classification Scheme 
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LogParser [51] is used to parse large amounts of log data according information 
stream of an IDS log file and web application log files.  Figure 22 depicts LogParser’s 
ability to accept an Apache Server access.log file as input and output pertinent web log 
events, which occurred within the previous two hours. Data captured from log parser was 




Figure 22: MS LogParser - Web Log Errors 
 
 
The decision was made to continue to utilize log parser on system related parsed files, 
but transition to a more integrated LogParser with PHP. Therefore, the 
ApacheLogIterator class was coded to integrate into AIRS. Due to ApacheLogIterator 
capabilities to iterate through the entire file one record at a time, it prevents loading the 
entire file into memory before processing. Although, the ApacheLogIterator class appears 
to be touted as a key feature, this feature is not an optimal scenario for processing 
extremely large apache log files, but it is manageable. 
National Vulnerability Database (NVD) 
The National Vulnerability Database (NVD) is supported by the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST). The NVD is a vulnerability database that provides an 
immense catalogue of known common vulnerabilities and exposures (CVEs) related to 
software and hardware, along with the vulnerability details. The AVOIDIT IRS 
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containing attack vector information uses the NVD as an external repository. Figure 13 
above highlights an example CVE used by AIRS. 
4.3 AVOIDIT IRS Attack Examples 
It is imperative to understand the phases of a full attack by analyzing each step used to 
launch the attack. Typically, when a cyber attack is launched against an organization’s 
assets, various levels of communication take place to understand what occurred, the 
impact, and how it can be rectified. Ordinarily organizations rely on a set of individuals to 
resolve the problem without suitable knowledge transfer. This approach to resolving 
security breaches can become time consuming and costly. This section depicts a couple of 
attack scenarios with the use of attack patterns and how the issue resolution system will 
aid in discovery and dissemination of information. 
In the first example, a user may notice a slow connection preventing access to 
resources and contact technical support. A technical support representative takes the 
information to report it appropriately. The information is elevated to a manager who in 
turn locates an administrator to assess the network. The administrator attempts to dissect 
the network by understanding what services are running to locate the possible exploitation. 
Once resolved the administrator informs appropriate personnel of closure. Table 8 






Table 8. Buffer Overflow Attack Pattern 
Pattern Buffer Overflow 
Attack Goal Distributed Denial of Service 
Conditions Misconfiguration and Insufficient Input 
Validation 
Attack Technique 1. Select a target site to disrupt. 
2. Broadcast executable code to randomly 
selected IP addresses to identify target 
systems running vulnerable software. 
3. Acquire a zombie network containing 
numerous systems with default 
configuration. 
4. Use the default configuration to exploit an 
input validation vulnerability. 
5. Allow injected code to run command to 
gain additional hosts. 
6. Send code to infected targets to re-
broadcast executable code. 
7. Affected computers will cause a denial of 
service to the initial target, in which the 
zombie network was created to attack. 
Attack Results Malicious code is continuously broadcasted to 
acquire more and more zombie targets to 
flood the target causing a denial of service. 
 
An alternative involves the issue resolution system discovering the reduction in 
bandwidth via the log file from the web server. A ticket is generated via the LogParser 
input to AIRS or by the technical representative stating a potential denial of service. The 
ticket is routed to the department of the servicing manager. The manager uses his 
knowledge of the application and determines the incident involved a compromise to a web 
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application. The manager then routes the ticket to the appropriate network administrator. 
The network administrator reviews the ticket and information provided to determine the 
best way to mitigate is to whitelist IP addresses. This flexibility captures the knowledge 
and communicates it appropriately between disciplines within an organization.  
The final example involves a somewhat new labeled attack via a social engineering 
aspect, where a user is tricked into clicking a malformed email to download unsuspecting 
malware from a bogus website. Table 9 describes the path to the attack used to 
successfully download malware on a victim’s computer.  
 
Table 9. Social Engineering Attack Pattern 
Pattern Social Engineering Attack 
Attack Goal Installed Malware 
Conditions Misinformed user clicks a bogus link 
Attack Technique 1. Send an email containing information in 
which a typical user may have interest. 
2. The email contains information that 
appears valid. 
3. Once email is opened and link is clicked, 
malware is installed onto the user’s 
computer unknowingly by the user from 
an unknown site. 
4. Step 3 allows the attacker to perform 
backdoor operations to the user’s 
compromised computer. 
Attack Results The user is tricked into installing malware 
onto computer where the attacker has full 





A social engineering attack vector is difficult to defend against with its use of 
deceptive measures for a user to partially agree with the results, but provides information 
to where the attack originates for future defenses. There are several instances in which 
AIRS is able to provide assistance. In this scenario, let us refer to figure 4 while assuming  
the installation of malware being successful and a CVE exists for this attack. AIRS will 
scan registry folders to capture modifications of the internal system; this is identified in 
Step 1. After the acquisition of the internal system information used by LogParser in Step 
2.1, AIRS attempts to locate an associated CVE externally. In Step 2.2, the CVEs are 
considered an external ticket and operate independently within AIRS to correlate events. 
Continuing our scenario, a modification to a registry has been flagged by LogParser and a 
CVE contains information to a site that has malware. Step 3 enables the classification of 
the LogParser events and the CVE events with aim to correlating the information for 
appropriate classification and defense. In Step 4, an initial ticket is generated by AIRS 
with preliminary information associated to user-installed malware and highlighting a 
potential solution contained within the CVE, where the relationship is finalized in Step 5. 
Step 6 provides semi-autonomous of beginning content analysis and extraction within the 
repository for attack association. Step 6 further enables human intervention via a network 
administrator where the ticket is analyzed and its content associated with relevant 
information. In this example, the network administer was able to perform remedial 
actions, highlighted in the CVE, to install a recommended patch to the email filter. Step 7 
provides the ontology relationships as needed within the organization to notify affected 
personnel. The information is communicated within AIRS and presented to the user 
through the user interface depicting the complete path to the attack in Step 8. 
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The correlation of internal incidents and an external vulnerability data enables quick 
information for a network administrator to consider solutions when defending against 
attacks on a local network.  
4.4 Metric Evaluation 
Metrics provide a way of determining how well AIRS is able to accurately classify a 
potential event. The use of  tree-based events will depict potential next occurrences in a 
sequence leading towards an attack. The metrics considered that  will aid in the discovery 
and defense of attacks are provided below: 
• True Positive – defined as the number of alert sequences that  are correctly 
detected. 
• True Negative – defined as the number of alert sequences correctly classified, 
but were not detected. 
• False Positive – defined as the number of alerts incorrectly detected as 
malicious in nature. 
• False Negative – defined as the number of alerts that are not detected. 
• Precision – defined as the ratio of alert sequences correctly detected as 
opposed to the number of incorrectly detected. 
• Recall – defined as the ratio of alert sequences correctly detected to the 
number of alerts that were not detected. 
• Mean Time to Incident Discovery - characterizes the efficiency of detecting 
attacks, by computing the average elapsed time between the initial occurrence 
of an incident and its subsequent discovery. 
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• Probability of Detection - defined as the probability of the correct 
classification of a module that contains a defect. 
These defined metrics are generic in nature and present a common measure in 
determining how well AIRS is able to classify and distribute defenses. These metrics 
highlighted are not a complete list, but provide insight regarding the considered 
techniques used to measure the quality of the system. Moreover, Simmons et al. [1D] 
proposed an attack-defense assessment of performance taxonomy (ADAPT), which offers 
the use of game inspired defense metrics within AIRS to objectively select the optimal 
game model. Also, data is captured related to the rate of occurrence of each attack vector 
and key events within web logs with intention to correlate data to provide useful 
reporting. Detailed transactions and various logs can be used to augment the ability of 
reconstructing a sequence of events that preceded a problem. Further, AIRS will be used 
to propose game models associated to the identified attack. 
In this chapter, we covered the implementation details of the AVOIDIT IRS, the 
algorithms used to classify vulnerabilities and log instances, as well as correlating events, 
the user interface and ontology for improved communication along with the test 
environment setup used in this dissertation. These sections provide an intuitive 
introduction of the interaction between components and how the information is conveyed 
to the end-user. The next chapter will cover the experiments and results using the 
AVOIDIT IRS. 
5. EXPERIMENT AND RESULTS 
This chapter will highlight the experiment setup and outcome of the testing using 
AVOIDIT IRS. Accuracy will be calculated for classification and propagation of 
defenses in an organization. Accuracy will determine how well AVOIDIT IRS correctly 
classifies attack vectors and relative information. This will be measured by the total 
number of attack vectors classified appropriately in each category divided by the total 
number of attack vectors. The following sections detail the experiment results, the 
metrics used to rate AIRS, and the source data used to test AIRS.  
5.1 Source Data 
Acquiring attack data for this project presented a significant hurdle to effectively 
capture attack vector information. Attack data is proprietary at many organizations, as 
they prevent the public from knowledge of an attack for threat of diminished reputation. 
Some of the highly referenced datasets were considered, such as DARPA 1999 and 
PKDD 2007, but the DARPA dataset has been criticized for being outdated [68] and the 
PKDD 2007 dataset was unavailable. Therefore, the attack modules containing well-
known web attacks within Metasploit were used as the primary source data, as well as the 
NVD repository of CVEs. This provides experiential analysis of AVOIDIT IRS ability to 
capture and classify attack vector information. Section 4.1 gives insight to the experiment 
setup for an attack test bed to capture near real work events. 
5.2 Training Data 
For the training data, I researched numerous sites that contained sql injection (SQLI), 
cross-site scripting (XSS), cross-site request forgery (CSRF), and file inclusion attacks 
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based on php web applications [78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86]. From this, I was able 
to train the algorithm to locate prevalent vulnerabilities for the classification rules. Figure 
23 provides an example of SQL Injection keywords from the various sources described 




Figure 23: SQL Injection Keyword Input into AVOIDIT IRS 
 
Each web query within AIRS, either POST or GET, is classified as a cross site 
scripting or sql injection attack under insufficient validation, directory traversal under 
incorrect permissions or authentication, or design flow. If the queries were not in either of 
these classes, they were considered normal, or user error.  
For training CVEs, we utilize the initial CVE experiment relative to Joomla! CMS, as 
well as 60 Wordpress CVEs and 5 dotProject CVEs (considering there are only 13 total), 
with a total of 125 CVEs for training. These CVEs were applied to the ID3 algorithm to 
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build the decision tree to classify new CVEs imported into the AIRS. A sample ID3 
algorithm decision tree is available in Appendix D. 
5.3 Experiment and Setup with Selenium 
The Metasploit attacks posed some difficulty, as described in section 4.1, considering 
the majority of those attacks required some level of unique information relative to 
sessions within the particular web application. To overcome this hurdle, Selenium [62] 
was used to create automated scripts that allowed for persistent session management. 
Selenium is an automation tool used for capturing user-defined events, such as login and 
logout, which allowed session based attacks to succeed.  
The environment was setup to describe a typical small-to-medium sized organization 
that contains several web applications running for internal and external users. The 
environment was composed of an Apache Web Server and MySQL databases on Ubuntu 
with PHP installed as the web scripting language of choice. This was all accomplished 
using the UltimateLAMP VMWare Image as identified in section 4.1. Using Selenium, 
we were able to record, script, and playback valid and invalid complex user interactions 
using various vulnerable web applications. Figure 24 highlights the test case scripts 
created to use for the registration user instance. 
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Figure 24: Selenium Automation Attack Test Bed Cases 
 
 
In constructing the automated attack test bed, thirty-six automated cases were created 
associated with Joomla, WordPress, and the dotProject web applications. These 
automated test cases consist of valid, invalid, and anomalous requests. The anomalous 
requests involved were automated to contain four sql injection attacks, one cross-site 
scripting attack, one file injection attack, and partial command injection attack. These 
attacks exploit the available vulnerabilities found in the experiment setup section 4.1 and 
the results section 5.5. Figure 25 depicts the Selenium test case scripts created for the 
automated attack test bed.  
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Figure 25: Selenium Automation Attack Test Bed Execution 
 
 
When the automated attack test bed is played through Selenium, the attack instances 
are viewed through the log files. Figure 26 depicts the results of Selenium test case 
scripts being executed through the apache access.log file, where over 1,000 lines of logs 
were captured. Variations of these scripts, as well as Nessus scans and SQLMap scans, 
produced over 5,000 lines of log instances. More precisely, there were 247 successful 
attack queries using Selenium and the remaining were just incorrect queries. There were 
138 attack queries performed by SQLMap and 48,915 queries performed using Nessus 
(of those 3,969 were extracted for Joomla and 2,488 extracted towards Wordpress). 
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Figure 26: Selenium Automation in Apache access.log 
 
 
An attempt was made to load AVOIDIT IRS on the virtual machine to monitor events 
in near real time using a cron job. Considering the UltimateLAMP web applications were 
written with an older version of PHP, and AIRS was written with the latest version of 
PHP, this discrepancy provided a major hurdle. Therefore, the decision was made to take 
the log files from the web applications and upload the log files into the AVOIDIT IRS. 
This allowed simulated scenario of AIRS capturing event information in near real time 
fashion. This also allows an unsophisticated user the capacity to load log data, 
anonymized if needed, to determine if an attack path is present and known vulnerabilities 
are associated to their system. The near real-time correlation is performed by AIRS, 
which has knowledge of the state of each application’s vulnerabilities and automatically 
correlates suspicious attack attempts against known vulnerabilities. 
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5.4 Example System Monitor in AVOIDIT IRS 
This section will provide an overview of using AIRS to arrive at capturing, 
correlating, and disseminating attack vector information. A case study is presented below 
to capture the essence of the issue resolution system for cyber attack management.  
Organization 
A small IT organization is looking to strengthen its operation relative to security 
events and investments. Currently, they have a booking application that monitors vendor 
related scheduling of various tasks. In addition, the booking application has an exterior 
facing form to the public, which is occasionally prone to a cyber attack. This application 
has proved successful in capturing vendor specific information and utilized by the human 
resources department to keep track of vendor expenditures. The booking application has a 
yearly budget of $100,000, but recent attempts to compromise the application, as well as 
others, has given the system administration team motive for more investment in security 
to management. Management has agreed to access the security concerns, if the system 
administration team can provide a composite view of the current state of monitored web 
applications. The system administration team decides to test the AVOIDIT IRS within 
the organization. Next is a step-by-step approach into allowing the AVOIDIT IRS to 
monitor a particular web application (this scenario is partially depicted in section 4.2.3):  
1. User enters system related information into AIRS as described by the AIRS 
Ontology. Figure 27 highlights this scenario. 
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Figure 27: AVOIDIT IRS Monitored System Input 
 
 
2. AIRS partitions its stakeholders into primary and secondary stakeholders to 
the application being monitored for notification. AIRS begins to search for 
known vulnerabilities from the external repository within AIRS. Once 
identified external vulnerabilities associated with the monitored application an 
alert is generated via the ‘Open Tickets’ section of the dashboard. Figure 19 
captures the essence of open, resolved, and closed tickets. Open tickets are 
opened upon an identified instance, whereas tickets recently remediated or 
mitigated are placed in a resolved status, finally tickets verified by the 
administrator are assigned a closed status. 
3. AIRS created an organizational committee of stakeholders. It notifies the 
responsible parties of the potential vulnerabilities that may be of immediate 
attention. Figure 28 depicts the notification once system information has been 
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inserted. The network administrator sets the Average Severity of the system 
that will be used to compute whether to defend or not to defend relative to a 
particular known vulnerability. 
 
 
Figure 28: AVOIDIT IRS Notification 
 
 
4. The responsible party, depending on role (for respective view purposes), 
becomes privy to vulnerabilities and the potential attack path associated with 
the inserted system. Figure 29 highlights a user’s view of an attack path. 
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Figure 29: AVOIDIT IRS Tree Structure 
 
 
5. Once the system administrator sets the path to the log file within the 
AVOIDIT IRS, it can begin to correlate known vulnerabilities with log 
instances. This log file is used to simulate web log monitoring. Figure 30 
highlights loading the log file. 
 
Figure 30: AVOIDIT IRS Apache File Upload 
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6. Immediately after loading the log file into AIRS the log instances are captured 
for notification to the administrator. Figure 31 illustrates the log file instances 
loaded into AIRS. 
 
 
Figure 31: AVOIDIT IRS Log Instances  
 
7. Once the known vulnerabilities have been classified and log instances loaded 
into the system, AIRS provides correlation notification of external 
vulnerabilities and internal attack instances within the CVEs captured in 
AIRS. Further, AIRS computes probability of child nodes of identified attack 
trees. Using the method described in section 3.7, figure 32 highlights the 
probability of an attacker using known vulnerabilities to reach the child nodes 
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of the identified attack tree to launch a successful attack. The child nodes do 
not necessarily mean an attack was successful, rather they represent the 
associated path to launching an attack. 
 
 
Figure 32: AVOIDIT IRS - Admin Probability Tree View 
 
 
The proposed approach assists with facilitating communication of security related 
events, wherein AIRS implicitly educates stakeholders on the importance of cyber 
security investment. In addition, AIRS illustrates how an organization can quantitatively 
view metrics associated to the complexities of the applications monitored. Management 




In this section, we provide the results of the selenium example provided in section 5.3 
associated to the classification accuracy and correlation of log files with CVEs.  
The CVE descriptions were mapped to AVOIDIT using the keywords provided in 
Appendix C and results show high recall and precision rates. In the CVE portion of the 
experiment, I utilized 1,025 CVEs to capture AIRS’s capability of classifying 
vulnerability information. AIRS successfully retrieved 443 specific CVEs associated to 
Wordpress, 534 related to Joomla!, and 8 related to dotProject (total of 985 out of 1025).  
Relative to WordPress 414, were correctly classified; Joomla!, 492 were correctly 
classified; and dotProject, 6 were correctly classified.  All were classified using the 
knowledge levied by security experts. Recall and Precision is used as highlighted in 
section 3.5 from testing the classification algorithm, as well as F-Measure to compute the 
weighted measure of precision and recall.  
Precision =  Total correctly classified    (1) 
   Total extracted 
 
Recall =     Total correctly classified   (2) 
   Total possible to be correctly extracted 
 
 F-Measure =  2RP / P + R     (3) 
 
AIRS successfully achieved a recall/true positive rate of eighty-eight percent. Recall 
was calculated as 912 correctly classified CVEs divided by 1,025 of the potential 
extracted CVEs (912/1025 = 89%). Precision was calculated as 912 correctly classified 
CVEs divided by 985 total number extracted CVEs (912/985 = 93%). The F-Measure 
was also calculated using 2 x (precision x recall) / precision + recall for 90% accuracy. 
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This is reflective of a system providing the administrator pertinent information associated 
to the systems of interest. The high classification accuracy can be attributed to the 
specific applications tested having a high concentration on SQL Injection attacks and 
Cross-Site Scripting vulnerabilities that allowed classification consistency. Table 10 
provides the precision, recall, and f-measure calculation results for WordPress, Joomla, 
and dotProject. 
 
Table 10. Precision, Recall, and F-Measure 
 Recall Precision F-measure 
Wordpress .83 .93 .88 
Joomla! .86 .92 .89 
dotProject .13 .75 .22 
Total .89 .925 .90 
 
Once I achieved an acceptable level of accuracy relative to classifying CVEs, the 
CVE correlation was applied to the log files. The Pearson’s correlation metric is used to 
measure the similarity between instances, measured by the following: 
Pearson’s Correlation =  1 – r    (4) 
Where,   r    =  𝑍(𝑥)  ×  𝑍(𝑦) 𝑛  (5) 
Table 11 highlights the CVEs that were used to test AIRS and its ability to capture 
log instances associated to CVEs. 
 
 
Table 11. CVE Log Correlation 









Table 11. CVE Log Correlation (Continued) 










Pearson’s Correlation .64 
 
 
Figure 33 highlights the scatter chart of Table 11, which provides information 
regarding the correlation CVEs to log files. The number of log instances identified by the 
IRS was used as the X axis  and the base score of the CVE was used as the Y axis. 
 
 
Figure 33: CVE Log Correlation Scatter Chart 
 
 
Correlating the CVEs with log file entries produced a correlation accuracy of 64% 
using the Pearson’s correlation highlighted in Table 11. This low correlation accuracy 
was mainly due to CVE-2006-4234, being ‘High’ in severity, only having one log entry 














event would have produced an increase in correlation. Additionally, CVE-2006-2667 was 
not fully operable in the Selenium test cases (see Appendix E for details), but I choose to 
provide the information contained in the CVE within the log files to produce a 
meaningful example of how the attack could occur. The algorithm was able to capture the 
sequence of related log instances, but unable to capture the sequence of associated CVEs 
as it appears the CVEs are directly targeted. Figure 34 depicts CVE-2006-6808 having 6 
correlated log instances.  
 
 
Figure 34: AVOIDIT IRS CVE Log Correlation 
 
AIRS assists the defender visually to ascertain the probability of an attack taking 
place using a Boolean condition if an attack was attempted in the log file via a known 
vulnerability. The value is set to 1 if the vulnerability has been attempted and captured in 
the log file and 0 if the vulnerability has not been attempted. Using the exponential 
distribution, we provide the probability of a CVE being used to launch an attack. This 
provides the defender with an incentive to ensure the initial parent node is secure from 
any child nodes being activated. 
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Further, the ID3 algorithm was incorporated for classifying each portion of the CVE 
upon input to AIRS. A modified version of the JavaScript implementation of the ID3 
algorithm was specifically used with the Google organizational charts to provide the user 
a representation of whether to defend or not to defend and to be cognizant of the 
components thereof. We provided the test input as described in Appendix D. Figure 35 
highlights the decision tree for analysis. 
 
Figure 35: ID3 Defend or Not Defend Decision Tree 
 
 
Figure 36 below displays the accuracy of the decision tree that is captured for 
analysis. The actual and predicted value is ‘Defend’, which exhibits a correct 





Figure 36: ID3 Defend or Not Defend Decision Tree Prediction Accuracy 
 
The AVOIDIT IRS was also able to intuitively retrieve game models that were 
assigned to certain attack vectors. As the CVEs were classified and correlated with log 
instances, a game model that closely matched the sequences of an attacker was selected. 
Figure 37 presents an example of game models used within AIRS. The decision was 








Figure 37: AVOIDIT IRS Game Model Screen 
 
 
This chapter provided the source data, training data, and an organizational example to 
depict the use of AIRS. The use of the ID3 algorithm enabled the defender to visualize 
the scenarios of whether to defend a particular monitored application. AVOIDIT IRS was 
used as a knowledge auditing tool to capture and disseminate attack vector information 
throughout the entire organization. The goal is to create an organization that is resilient to 
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attacks in all functional areas. AIRS will enable attack data to flow more accurately 
within an organization.  
The tools of which I attempted evaluation were AMNESIA and PANACEA. The 
AMNESIA project posed difficulty with the installation and execution prescribed, 
therefore I was unable to get this project up and running for comparison. Numerous 
communication attempts to work with the authors resulted in the testAMNESIA script 
producing zero detected attacks against the vulnerable sites within its project. The 
PANACEA tool has been abandoned by the authors, which did not allow comparison. 
Tools that were actually evaluated were STRANGER and CVE Checker. The 
AVOIDIT IRS differs from the STRANGER tool in that it correlates the CVEs with log 
instances and attempts to perform sequential graph for a defender to visualize the 
probability of an attacker proceeding to a child node. The AVOIDIT IRS, although not a 
dynamic analysis tool, would be considered a dynamic analysis tool in comparison to the 
STRANGER tool. Potentially, the STRANGER tool can be incorporated into the 
AVOIDIT IRS to provide developers a more in depth look into the code that they develop. 
Wherein the CVE Checker tool being closely associated to the AVOIDIT IRS, as well, 
only provides CVE notification to the defender of the potential software vulnerabilities 
installed on the current system. The CVE Checker, open source and written in C, can be 
utilized by the AVOIDIT IRS to speed the backend classification process of imported 
CVEs. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this dissertation, we developed an ontology based attack issue resolution system 
that can provide probable attack information relative to monitored web applications to 
improve attack discovery, classification, and defense dissemination. Our proposed 
methodology utilizes an attack taxonomy as a repository schema within an ontology 
based issue resolution system to facilitate communication regarding cyber attacks within 
an organization. Knowledge engineering was used to elicit experiential knowledge via a 
questionnaire interview to capture relevant concepts for effective cyber attack 
communication. It is essential as cyber attacks continue to evolve that a knowledge 
system matures in capturing significant attack data to improve organizational resiliency. 
We developed an algorithm to extract 985 out of 1,025 external common 
vulnerabilities and exposures (CVEs) related to monitored web applications in AIRS. We 
demonstrated the AVOIDIT IRS being able to classify external CVEs with a recall of 
88% and precision of 93%.  We implemented an attack test bed to capture over 5,000 
instances within log files. The attack test bed consisted of the Metasploit and the 
UltimageLAMP project housing vulnerable Joomla, Wordpress, and dotProject web 
applications. A correlation algorithm was developed to correlate the external CVEs with 
internal log files to produce a correlation metric of 66%.  
For visualization, AIRS was developed as an open source web tool written in PHP 
with the Codeigniter framework. The exponential distribution was coded into AIRS to 
provide the probability of a CVE being used in an identified attack tree to launch a 
successful attack. An ID3 algorithm was incorporated for classifying each portion of the 
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CVE upon input to AIRS to produce a Google organizational chart to visually assist the 
defender with determining whether to defend or not to defend. Moreover, a game model 
selection component was implemented to capture the attacker and defender action space. 
This work has presented research involving an ontology-based AIRS to improve 
communication of attack information and defense reusability. AVOIDIT IRS will allow 
ontology relationships for discovery by automated agents to increase confidence that a 
pertinent application is at risk of being compromised for appropriate decision making. 
AIRS can be used by security managers, project managers, developers, network 
administrators, and support personnel. AVOIDIT IRS enables smaller organizations to 
not only understand the exploit, but also the strategy needed to mitigate and/or remediate 
auxiliary damages.  
6.1 Limitations 
Attacks are increasing in the cyber world, and being able to prevent all attacks is 
extremely difficult.  In this section we highlight two distinct limitations of the AVOIDIT 
IRS. Other limitations are available for discussion, but the author chose to omit these 
considering the below limitations have an immediate impact on the proposed taxonomy.  
a. Taxonomy Defense Strategies and Physical Attack Limitation 
The defense strategies in AVOIDIT present a defender with an appropriate starting 
point to mitigate and/or remediate an attack.  The plausible defenses are enormous, so the 
proposed taxonomy provides a high level approach to cyber defense.  Although AVOIDIT 
is extensible, more research is needed to provide an exhaustive list of possible defense 
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strategies for each attack vector exploited. This is accomplished using the AVOIDIT IRS 
to track attack vectors and respective defenses.  
Deterring physical attacks is an important aspect in sustaining security.  While it is 
necessary to understand physical attacks, the AVOIDIT IRS focuses on cyber attacks.  
Further research can be done to include the physical aspect of cyber security, which may 
include the end hosts of an attack. For example, cyber attacks that begin with use of a 
USB drive are not present in the current state of the AVOIDIT Taxonomy, but can be 
included  in future endeavors. 
b. Real-time Processing Limitation 
Although we were able to classify numerous CVEs and correlate log instances 
relative to monitored applications, AIRS is not a real time application. The 
ApacheLogIterator feature was not an optimal scenario for processing extremely large 
apache log files. However, this dissertation exhibited the effectiveness of correlating 
pertinent external and internal application data. As conducted in [42] and [45] for attack 
graph generation, a C++ engine is required to improve classification and correlation 
processing speed and is considered future work.  
6.2 Future Work 
The target population of AVOIDIT IRS is small to medium sized organizations that 
have a desire to correlate external and internal incidents.  This dissertation found the 
AVOIDIT IRS provided an accurate heuristic in retrieving monitored web application 
public vulnerabilities and log instances using information extraction and decision tree 
techniques.  
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Future work will involve the continuous improvement of the AVOIDIT taxonomy 
that captures cloud and mobile computing, as well as physical related attacks. Using an 
updated AVOIDIT schema, we will further use the attack issue resolution system within a 
Game Inspired Defense Architecture (GIDA) to investigate the applicability of the 
AVOIDIT IRS classifying attack vector information to determine the action space of the 
attacker. AIRS will determine the type of attack. GIDA will use the information to assess 
candidate game models identified by AIRS to select the optimal game model for defense 
[1D]. The game model identified, being the most relevant to the attack in question, will 
be executed to yield a better overall payoff to the defender. Moreover, honeypot 
technology will be used as input into the AVOIDIT IRS to facilitate attack/defender 
action spaces and the classification of zero day exploits.  
As a part of future work, an improved classification and correlation engine will be 
developed in C++ for speed and real time data processing. An improved processing speed 
will ensure AIRS’ usefulness to management, administrators, developers, and the like to 
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A. Software Packages 
A considerable amount of software was used in the construction of the AVOIDIT 
Issue Resolution System. The current technologies that were used are described below. 
Codeigniter 
Codeigniter [74] is an award winning open source content management system used 
to build web sites and web applications. In this dissertation, Codeigniter and the 
Codeigniter PHP5 based framework were used in the construction of a knowledge base to 
develop the AVOIDIT Issue Resolution System for cyber incident management. Other 
tools were used in conjunction with Codeigniter, as plugins, to maximize the ease of 
constructing the AVOIDIT IRS. 
jQuery 
jQuery [44] is a JavaScript based library used for efficient HTML document traversal 
and manipulation, event handling, animation, and Ajax across a multitude of browsers. 
With jQuery being small, fast, and possessing a feature-rich JavaScript library, it  makes 
it a good candidate for this research.  
jOrgChart 
jOrgChart [45] is a jQuery plugin capable of converting nested unordered lists into 
tree-based menus using a functional organization chart output. It has the capacity to 
support numerous depth for visualizing hierarchical data. jOrgChart is used in this 
dissertation to construct the hierarchical nature of the attack path. 
ApacheLogIterator 
 129 
ApacheLogIterator [46] is a simple and efficient Apache log file parser, which 
extends the SPLFileObject php class. Normally, SPLFileObject class is used to open a 
file and read each line accordingly. The ApacheLogIterator uses this functionality to 
simply read the raw data from the file into a structured array. The class below provides a 
synopsis of the code used to capture items from the log file. This will be used to 





class ApacheLogFields { 
    /** 
     * @var string Regular expression to extract relevant data from an Apache log record. 
     */ 
    public $regex = '/^\w\w\w \d\d? \d\d:\d\d:\d\d\s(\S+)\s(\S+)\s(\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+)\s-\s-\s\[([^\[]+)\] 
"(\S+) (.*?) (\S+)\/\S+" (\d+) (\d+) "(.*?)" "(.*?)"\s*$/'; 
    /** 
     * @var array Defines the index position of each field in the regex matches array. ( 
     */ 
    public $fieldArray = array( 
        'originalLogEntry', //element zero is the full returned string. 
        'localServer', 
        'host', 
        'remoteIP', 
        'datetime', 
        'method', 
        'query', 
        'scheme', 
        'status', 
        'bytes', 
        'referrer', 
        'userAgent', 
    ); 
} 
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B. Database Model 
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D. CVE ID3 Algorithm Decision Tree Training Data 
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E. Automation Attack Test Bed 
Here we will  cover a bit of what each of these test cases do and how they are organized. 
Quite a bit of effort went into making these well behaved, but real-world issues.  
However, someone will certainly discover new and creative ways to break them. Please 
refer to this section, then the test steps themselves when troubleshooting automated test 
problems.  
 
There are three sub-sets of test cases. One group deals with Joomla, one with DotProject, 
and one with Wordpress. Although test runs always start at the beginning of the list, you 
may want to split testing off into separate test suites for your own purposes at a later time. 
 
Generally, the first rule of each set creates a test user to be used throughout the 
application's test cases. The last one aims to clean up any artifacts, including the test user, 
and restore the system to a 'clean' state. In between are several typical transactions and a 
few exploits.  
1 to 15 with Joomla 
16 to 27 with DotProject 
28 to 36 with Wordpress  
01 Joomla - Create User – Success 
Log in to Joomla as Admin 
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Create a new user called "Selenium" 
Save and logout 
02 Joomla - Create User - Failure 
Log in as Admin 
Attempt to create an invalid user 
Error out (duplicate username) 
Give up and logout 
03 Joomla - User Post Web Link- Success 
Log in as new test user 
 Post a new web link 
 Logout 
04 Joomla - User Post Web Link – Failure 
Log in as new test user 
Post duplicate link 
Error out  
Give up and logout 
05 Joomla - Create Banner – Success 
Log in as Admin 
 Create a new banner 
 Save and logout 
06 Joomla - Create Banner - Failure 
Log in as Admin 
Create banner using invalid parameters 
 Give up and logout 
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07 Joomla - Guest Vote - Success 
No user login 
Submit a vote   (Note: Server-side time constraint prohibits multiple votes) 
 08 Joomla - Guest Vote – Failure 
No user login 
Submit vote without selecting any option 
09 Joomla - Guest News Browsing - Success 
No user login 
Browse a few valid news pages 
10 Joomla - Guest News Browsing - Failure 
No user login 
Browse invalid news page 
11 Joomla Gest Contact Us – Success 
No user login 
Submit message via "Contact Us" page 
12 Joomla Guest Contact Us - Failure 
 No user login 
 Submit incomplete message via "Contact Us" page 
13 Joomla SQL Injection 1 
Log in as Admin  
Open polllwindow.php with SQL Injection querying the Database version 




This uses the SQL "Union" statement to append a new query's result to the initial poll id 
query.  
14 Joomla SQL Injection 2 
Log in as Admin  
Open polllwindow.php with SQL Injection to dump database users and password hashes 
Exploit URL: /joomla/administrator/popups/pollwindow.php?pollid=1 union select 
concat(username,0x3a,password) from jos_users/* 
Note: 
This uses the SQL "Union" statement to append a new query's result to the initial poll id 
query.  
15 Joomla - Admin Clean Up  
Remove test user 
Remove web link 
Remove banner 
Save and logout 
16 DotProject - Admin Add user - Success 
Log in as Admin user 
Create a new test user named Selenium 
Set permissions and roles for new user 
Save and logout 
17 DotProject - Admin Login - Failure 
Attempt to login as Admin, using invalid passwords 
18 DotProject - Test User Prep Project - Success 
Log in as test user 
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Create a test Company 
Create a test Project 
Save and logout 
19 DotProject - Test User Prep Project - Failure 
Log in as test user 
Attempt to create company using invalid options 
Attempt to create test project using incomplete options 
Logout 
20 DotProject - Test User New Task - Success 
Log in as test user 
Create new task for test project 
Save and logout 
21 DotProject - Test User New Task - Failure 
Log in as test user 
Attempt to create task using invalid parameters 
Create task using meaningless data 
Delete new task  
Save and logout 
22 DotProject - Test User Manage Tickets - Success 
Log in as test user 
Create a ticket using ticket manager system 
Save and logout 
23 DotProject - Test User Manage Tickets - Failure 
Log in as test user 
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Attempt to create ticket using incomplete parameters 
Create ticket using meaningless data 
Delete new ticket 
Save and logout 
24 DotProject Remote File Inclusion Attempt 
Open the default DotProject page, logging out any current user 
Open the DotProject db_connect page specifying a remote website to include 




25 DotProject SQL Injection 1 
Login as test user 
Open the ticket search page 
Enter the following exploit in the search field input field.  
Exploit text:  all' union select version(), version(), 'n', 'n', 'n'/* 
Note: The data entered in this field gets passed to the back end database without being 
sanitized!  
26 DotProject SQL Injection 2 
Login as test user 
Open the ticket search page 
Enter the following exploit in the search field input field.  
Exploit text: all' union select 'n', user_username, user_password, 'n', 'n' from users/* 
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Note: The data entered in this field gets passed to the back end database without being 
sanitized!  
27 DotProject Admin Cleanup 
Login as admin 
Delete the test Project 
Delete the test Company 
Delete the test user 
Delete the test tickets 
Save and logout 
28 Wordpress - Admin Create Test User - Success 
Login as admin 
Create a test user named Selenium 
Save and sign out 
29 Wordpress - Admin Create Test User - Failure 
Login as admin 
Create a test user using invalid parameters 
Save and sign out 
30 Wordpress - Test User Comment - Success 
Log in as test user 
View the "Hello World!" post 
Add a comment 
Confirm the comment 
Logout 
31 Wordpress - Test User Comment - Failure 
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Log in as test user 
View the "Hello World!" post 
Attempt to add a duplicate comment 
Fail and give up 
Logout 
32 Wordpress - Admin Clear Comment - Success 
Log in as admin 
Navigate to comment management page 
Delete new pending comment 
Save and logout 
33 Wordpress - Test User Permissions - Failure 
Log in as test user 
Attempt to navigate to admin file manager page 
Fail and give up 
Logout 
34 Wordpress Cross Site Script (XSS) 
Log in as admin 
Navigate to main blog page 
Open the evil exploit link (below) 
Return to the main blog page 
Logout 
Exploit: http://192.168.0.2/wordpress/wp-admin/templates.php?file=<img src=%27%27 




35 Wordpress Command Injection (concept) 
Note: This exploit is not fully functional through Selenium at the moment. We provided 
log instances that would accomplish a near task. 
 
   Open "user profile update" page (HTML Referrer value is significant here) 
   Use Javascript to create new HTTP POST parameters including a line break 
   Submit to web server 
   Exploit (part 1) 
   <input type="text" name="display_name" value="selenium"%0d0aecho phpinfo();"> 
36 Wordpress Admin Clean Up 
Log in as Admin 
Navigate to the user management page 
Delete the test user 
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